Mr. SURREY. No, sir.

Mr. JENNER. What color was it, if you noticed?

Mr. SURREY. It was either a dark brown or a maroon.

Mr. JENNER. You followed it awhile and then gave up the chase?

Mr. SURREY. That is correct. Actually, they made a turn which—I am familiar with downtown Dallas—and they made a turn which would indicate they were doubling back or not going in a straight direction. And I thought perhaps I had been spotted in my convertible. So I left them there.

Mr. JENNER. I will close, Mr. Chief Justice, by asking the witness—was the Mormon church in session? Had there been——

Mr. SURREY. There had been services.

Mr. JENNER. The evening of April 10?

Mr. SURREY. They were still dispersing.

Mr. JENNER. When you arrived at approximately 9:30 in the evening of April 10, were people still leaving the Mormon church?

Mr. SURREY. Yes; they were.

Mr. JENNER. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all, Mr. Surrey. You may be excused now.

The Commission is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

*Thursday, June 18, 1964*

## TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY AND ROBERT CARSWELL

The President's Commission met at 9 a.m., on June 18, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; and Samuel A. Stern, assistant counsel.

## TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY

(Members present at this point: Chief Justice Earl Warren.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will come to order.

Chief, it is our procedure to read a little statement as to the purpose of the meeting, for the benefit of the witness.

Chief Rowley will be asked to testify with respect to the protective measures taken by the Secret Service in Dallas, changes in such measures made as a result of the Dallas experience, and with regard to the investigation of the assassination and any information he may have respecting the assassination of the President.

Would you raise your right hand and be sworn?

You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROWLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, before starting the examination, I would like to make a brief statement for your benefit and for the benefit of the Commission, of the problems that are probably going to develop in this area with regard to the security of the country, and a suggestion about how we might handle them as we proceed with the witness.

I have suggested to Chief Rowley that as he moves along in his testimony he might have various matters that he would think should not be on the record

because of the security of the country, and if he would just suggest that, when he came to that point, and say specifically that it did involve the security of the country, then we would proceed to go off the record, if it was satisfactory to the Commission, and consider those questions off the record. And then return to the record as soon as we had completed those security matters.

Would that be satisfactory?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is an appropriate way to proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, will you state your name and address for the record, please?

Mr. ROWLEY. James J. Rowley, 3501 Rittenhouse Street NW., Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official position with the Government?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have, as Chief of the U.S. Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. ROWLEY. Since September 1, 1961.

Mr. RANKIN. What is the nature of the duties of that position?

Mr. ROWLEY. The nature of the duties is the general overall supervision of the activities of the Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. And, in a general way, what is the official responsibility under the statutes of the United States of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we are responsible under title 18, section 3056, to investigate all violations that affect the currency, securities, and coinage of the United States. That involves Government bonds, Government checks, and such other functions and duties as are authorized by law, subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury.

In addition, we have the responsibility of the protection of the President, members of his immediate family, the Vice President, President-elect, Vice President-elect, and the former President for a reasonable period of time as he leaves office.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you please tell us what experience you had with the Secret Service prior to the time that you became chief.

Mr. ROWLEY. I was in charge of the White House detail from 1946 to 1961.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell us briefly the training that you had in regard to Government Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. I first entered the Government as a member of the FBI in 1937, and spent a year with the FBI, after which I went back to New York for a period of 9 months. I entered the Secret Service on September 12, 1938. I spent time in criminal investigation in the New York City office, and the Utica office of Secret Service and in April of 1939, I was assigned to Washington, eventually to the White House detail.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. I served as a member of the White House detail, as an agent on a shift, as an assistant agent in charge, agent in charge of the shift, and advance man, in preparing for Presidential visits, both domestically and abroad.

Mr. RANKIN. What educational training did you have?

Mr. ROWLEY. I had 2 years of college toward a B.S., then I was graduated from law school, and secured a master's degree in law.

Mr. RANKIN. Was one of the duties of your position as chief of the Service to have general supervision over the trip of President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson to Dallas around November 22, 1963?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, that would be part of my job—the general supervision of the trip. The actual direct supervision would have been under the jurisdiction of Mr. Behn, who was in charge of the White House detail.

Mr. RANKIN. Could you describe briefly the nature of Mr. Behn's responsibilities in that work?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, it would have been, as mine was in the period I was there, that he was responsible for developing all arrangements with the members of the White House staff, designating the members of the detail to develop advance work, assigning agents to the various shifts, directing their training as it applied to the White House detail, and participating in any event that he thought would be necessary in connection with his work at the White House.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you become familiar with what did happen on that trip, in your position as chief?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I was first informed while addressing a graduating class of our Secret Service school on that day. I was summoned by Mr. Behn to the White House, at which time he told me that the President had been shot. He was then at the hospital, and subsequently we were notified that the President had died; that the Vice President would take the oath of office in the airplane at Love Field.

In the meantime, I asked my deputy, who was in his office while I was at the White House, to arrange with the Immigration Service to close the border, Texas being in close proximity to the border. There might have been a conspiracy or something, we didn't want to take any chances. And then I immediately dispatched an inspector from my staff to the Capitol to protect the Speaker, and directed the other activities as we got the information from Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you learn in connection with the trip when the assassination occurred that certain of the Secret Service agents had been in the press club and what is called the Cellar, at Fort Worth, the night before?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, that came to my attention through a broadcast that Mr. Pearson made, that the agents were inebriated the night before at the Fort Worth Press Club. I immediately dispatched Inspector McCann to Fort Worth to investigate the report, and to interview the agents.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you learn?

Mr. ROWLEY. I learned that there were nine agents involved at the Press Club. And I might say this—the agents on duty throughout that day had no opportunity to eat. When they arrived at Fort Worth, they were informed that there was a buffet to be served at the Fort Worth Club. This is what I ascertained in personal interviews. Upon going over there, they learned there was no buffet, and some of them stayed for a drink. Three, I think, had one scotch, and others had two or three beers. They were in and out—from the time they arrived, I would say roughly around 12:30, until the place closed at 2 o'clock.

Now, after that some of them went to the Cellar. This is a place that does not serve alcoholic beverages. They went there primarily, I think, out of curiosity, because this was some kind of a beatnik place where someone gets up and recites, or plays the guitar.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you learn whether or not there were any violations of the regulations of the Secret Service by these men?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; there was a violation. At that time there was a section in our manual in effect that said that during——

Mr. RANKIN. Will you give us first the number?

Mr. ROWLEY. Section 10.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that chapter 1, page 7?

Mr. ROWLEY. Chapter 1, page 7; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell the Commission about what the regulation was?

Mr. ROWLEY. "The use of liquor. Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours they are officially employed at their post of duty or when they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an official duty."

The one that applies here—"However, all members of the White House detail and special agents cooperating with them on presidential and similar protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House detail and special agents cooperating with them or by special agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel status, is prohibited."

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell the Commission how many men were involved in these trips to the Press Club and the Cellar, where these things were done?

Mr. ROWLEY. There were 9 men involved at the Press Club, and there were 10 men involved at the Cellar.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, how many men, of those 10 men, were in the Presidential motorcade on the day of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Four—four men were in the followup car.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were they?

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know their names?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; Landis, Hill, Ready, and Bennett.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you make any investigation to determine whether or not their violation of the Secret Service regulations had anything to do with the assassination of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes. They performed their duties from the time they departed in the followup car from Love Field until the point of the tragedy in a most satisfactory manner. There was nothing deficient in their actions or their alertness. They went through the heaviest part of downtown Dallas, through the crowds, and performed in an exemplary manner.

Mr. RANKIN. How do you know that?

Mr. ROWLEY. From the reports that I got from their superiors.

Mr. RANKIN. In the work that you did with the White House detail before you became Chief of the Secret Service, did you know the various responsibilities of the members of the White House detail?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever participate in such motorcades yourself?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. How much?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I have participated, in rough numbers, over a period of 22 years—roughly, maybe, a thousand or more.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you briefly describe the functions of the Secret Service agents in connection with the President's car?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished this other matter?

Mr. RANKIN. No; I just wanted to——

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go right ahead.

Mr. ROWLEY. When the President's car leaves the airport or a railroad station or any other location, the agents accompany him to the car and stand to the right and left, in the same order as their designated positions on the followup car, and screen him. And then the car moves out, slowly, because the rest of the cars have to have an opportunity to follow in the motorcade, so that none lingers behind, or is left behind. And when the agent in the lead car determines that the motorcade is intact and is moving, then he steps up his speed, which is a cue to the Presidential driver to step up his speed, and then they go at a speed consistent with the crowd that is there, and so forth.

Now, upon leaving the airport, if there is a huge crowd there, the men are still on the ground running on the right and left side of the President, both rear and front of the vehicle. After they get out of the crowd, then the men in the front beside the Presidential vehicle drop back and take their positions in the followup car.

This is so that they are not in the way of the men running on the right and left rear. They move back last and have a clear opportunity to jump onboard the followup car in the event the speed of the motorcade is stepped up.

When the motorcade comes to intersections or turns which are always vulnerable points, in that if you make a right turn, that is the closest point for someone to come out, the agents on the right side before reaching that point, will jump off, to be available alongside the President's car in the event someone darts out with some malicious plan.

There have also been times when, innocently, ladies and young people will come out to throw a bouquet of flowers. And then if there is a crowd that is sparse, they return to their position in the followup car.

Now, when they come into a big crowd, they take it on foot, and at a little jog, if necessary.

In some instances, if the crowd continues for a prolonged distance, the agents work together. In other words, there are rear steps on the right and left rear of the Presidential car with handrails. These have two purposes. One, for agents to ride on and to screen the President from anything from above; the second, in a situation like this, to keep an additional man available in case of trouble, and also to alternate with the men to the right rear of the President, who are jogging along warding off the crowd.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, what positions did the four men that you referred to that

were involved in the press club and the Cellar matter occupy on the day of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, Mr. Ready occupied the right front, Mr. Landis to his rear——

Mr. RANKIN. What do you mean by right front?

Mr. ROWLEY. Right front running board position of the followup car. It was his responsibility or duty to jump off in crowds and to take the position at the right rear of the President's car.

Mr. Landis, if necessary, to jump off if the occasion demanded and take the right front of the President's car.

Mr. Hill was on the left front running board of the followup car, and his responsibility was at the rear of the President's car. His position was assigned there because he was in charge of the First Lady's detail, and she was seated on the left side.

And Mr. McIntyre was to his rear on the left running board. So his assignment would have been up to the left front of the President's car. Mr. Bennett was in the rear seat of the followup car.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, how can you tell that the fact that they were out as they were the night before and violated the regulations, had nothing to do with the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, based on the reports of my investigating agents and the facts as to how they performed at the time of the tragedy. Mr. Hill, who was on the left side, responded immediately—as he looked toward the Presidential car, being on the left side, he scanned from left to right, and when he saw there was something happening to the President following a noise, he immediately jumped from his position to get aboard from his side.

Mr. Ready scanned to the right so he was looking away from the President, because he was looking around from the right side. As a consequence, he wasn't aware of what was happening in the front. The car was also going on a turn at that time.

Mr. RANKIN. What about the other two?

Mr. ROWLEY. The other two were watching—they reacted normally—the man on the left side looked to his left rear, and the man, Landis, looked to his right rear.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you done anything to discipline these men for violation of the regulations of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I did consider what type of punishment would be provided.

Then I also considered the fact that these men in no way had—their conduct had no bearing on the assassination. And, therefore, I thought that in the light of history, to place a stigma on them by punishing them at that time, from which inevitably the public would conclude that they were responsible for the assassination of the President—I didn't think this was fair, and that they did not deserve that, with their family and children.

(At this point, Representative Ford entered the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. May I ask one question there?

You described the assignment of the four men with respect to the followup car and the President's car. Do they have different assignments with regard to watching what is happening around them, or does that depend on the circumstances in which they are?

Mr. ROWLEY. Both. When they start off they have a certain area that they have to watch. Like the man in the right front would naturally watch slightly to the right and in front of him. The fellow on the side, behind him, will watch to the right and rear. In other words, as they are going by a building, he should scan the building. In the meantime, he picks up where the man in the front has finished. In other words, the scan of the man in the front will cover the building to his front and side; the fellow behind will scan alongside from rear to forward. Their scanning joins. This is the way they are accustomed to doing it.

Mr. DULLES. Who would cover straight ahead?

Mr. ROWLEY. The man in the front seat has that responsibility.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, how do you construe subparagraph (c) of your regulation 10 regarding the use of alcoholic liquors?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read it for the record?

Mr. RANKIN. Will you kindly read it?

Mr. ROWLEY. "Violation or slight disregard of the above paragraphs or the excessive or improper use of intoxicating liquor at any time will be cause for removal from the service. In interpreting the words 'excessive' and 'improper,' slight evidence tending to indicate unusual or questionable conduct will be considered proof that the use of liquor has been improper or excessive. Association with others who drink to excess will be considered as an indication of using more than a moderate amount of liquor. The excuse that liquor was used for medicinal purposes will not be accepted."

Mr. RANKIN. How do you construe and apply that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, in this instance, it was wrong.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, were these men under this regulation considered to be on travel status, so that they should not be using intoxicating liquor?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And there is no question about that in your mind?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Has anything been done to reprimand and cause them to realize that this is a violation of your regulations?

Mr. ROWLEY. They were interviewed by the inspector at the time. The seriousness of the matter was impressed upon them. And I think they recognize the seriousness of their acts.

The men we recruit are men that are college graduates and mature, and we screen them very carefully, particularly before we assign them to the White House detail. They know and we know that they are in a fishbowl 24 hours a day, and that, therefore, their conduct is always subject to scrutiny, and so forth, and that they are responsible individuals. Their records have indicated that they have been performing in a high degree. They have worked endless hours of overtime. They are dedicated. And if they were not, they would not be on the detail.

They realize the seriousness of the violation, and I went over it with my special agent in charge. He understands it. And I am quite sure that they all understand it at this time.

Mr. RANKIN. I would like to have you examine Commission Exhibit No. 1018, Chief Rowley, and see if that is the regulation of the Secret Service that you have been referring to.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; that is what I have been reading here, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to offer as a part of the record the regulation, Commission Exhibit No. 1018.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document was marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1018, and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, have you had any other complaints similar to this in regard to the conduct of the Secret Service agents on the Presidential or White House detail?

Mr. ROWLEY. We had one in the last month. We had charges leveled at us by an agent of the Secret Service——

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Who is currently under indictment, and who will be brought to trial on criminal charges on the 29th of June. And, for that reason, while I have no reluctance to discuss it, I think we should go off the record, because I don't want to in any way prejudice the case.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no reason to discuss that case here, Chief.

Is there anything in particular that would affect this situation you wanted to know about, Mr. Rankin?

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, the only thing would be the investigation as to whether or not there was comparable conduct. I didn't know whether the Commission would like to know what that investigation was and what the results of it were.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose there is no objection to the Chief telling us what this complaint was, but not insofar as it bears on the crime that he is charged with.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, it ties in with the crime, because he said he was framed.

Now, he said he was framed because he was prepared to go before your Commission, sir, to testify about this thing that happened 3 years ago, and in the charges he said he advised me, as well as others, and nothing was done. He said he was framed for this reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Had he ever made any complaint to you before?

Mr. ROWLEY. He had never made any complaint to me. It came as a complete surprise.

Representative FORD. The complaint to you came subsequent to the filing of criminal charges against him?

Mr. ROWLEY. He said he had made the charges at the time the alleged incidents occurred, Mr. Congressman, that he notified me, before he left an assignment 3 years ago.

Let me give you the background, so there is no misunderstanding. We have what we call an orientation program. The men we recruit from the colleges, and the type of men that we want, we cannot always get off the civil service roster. Therefore, we have an understanding with Civil Service that we can take men under schedule A. Within a period of 2 years, they will have to be assigned to the White House or dropped from the Service.

Now, in order to determine their ability and fitness for assignment, since some people are better criminal investigators than they are in protection work, we have an orientation program which includes duty on the White House detail. Mr. Bolden was one of the men selected to come in the summer of 1961. He was also a replacement for some regular agent on the detail who was on leave. It was a 30-day assignment. This afforded us an opportunity to observe him, determine whether he was equipped and so forth.

And he was on the White House detail for this short period of time. The time that he describes was a 5-day weekend up in Hyannis Port.

Mr. RANKIN. I don't think that quite answers——

Mr. ROWLEY. I am giving the background.

Mr. RANKIN. I think the question is as to when you got the complaint.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well—excuse me. [Continuing.] Before he left his detail assignment, you see, he alleges that he told me about the condition that was going on up in Hyannis.

Representative FORD. Before he left on this 30-day assignment?

Mr. ROWLEY. When he left to return to his office in Chicago.

Mr. RANKIN. And what is the fact in that regard?

Mr. ROWLEY. The fact is he never informed me. He never informed any of his supervisors or anyone on the detail.

Mr. RANKIN. I think the record should show, Mr. Chairman, that we were never advised that he wanted to testify, nor had we any inquiry or anything about the matter, until after we learned about it in the newspapers. And, even then, he didn't ask to testify. And we asked the FBI to check into it, and he had counsel, and they refused to tell anything about the matter at that time.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question?

Did I understand you to say that the Civil Service prescribes that certain men must be assigned to the White House for a certain detail?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, Mr. Dulles; we have an arrangement with the Civil Service that they will permit us to recruit these men, not from the register, but under what they call schedule A. They give us an opportunity, 2 years, to train these men, with the understanding that within 2 years' time they will have to be assigned to the White House detail or we will not be able to retain them in the Service.

However, during that 2 years, we urge them to take the civil service examination, so that they get on the register. And then when they do—quite frequently this occurs—they are selected from the register, and once they become permanent, if they are not interested in the White House detail, then they continue their work as a criminal investigator in the field.

Mr. DULLES. But if they do not take that special examination, then—and become a part of the civil service, then they have to be assigned to the White House, to stay on?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. I was a little worried when you said certain people had to be assigned to the White House, that you were under compulsion to assign certain people to the White House in order to retain them.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; anyone who works in the White House, whether he is an electrician, a painter, or anything, for a period of 2 years, he automatically becomes eligible for permanent civil service status.

Representative FORD. Is that by law or by regulation?

Mr. ROWLEY. That I cannot say. I would always interpret it as under law. I may be wrong on that, Mr. Ford, but this is what happens. When our men spend 2 years on the detail at the White House, they come within that classification.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief, can you clarify Commissioner Dulles' inquiry? The Civil Service does not direct that you put certain people in the White House?

Mr. ROWLEY. Oh, no: we do that in order to—I see your point, sir. We do that in order to give them the permanency that they should have to continue their employment with the Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. But that is the choice of the Secret Service rather than anybody else?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I gather the Civil Service prescribed if they did not do this, they could not be retained. Is that correct?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. In other words——

Mr. DULLES. There is some pressure, I should think.

Mr. ROWLEY. There is no pressure, because we voluntarily entered into an agreement with them, sir, for this arrangement, explaining that we frequently don't get from the register the type of men that we want, and that, therefore, we want the opportunity to recruit the men from the universities or colleges. Once they have served on the White House detail for a period of 2 years, then they would get this permanent status. However, during the 2 years, they have an opportunity and they are encouraged to take the civil service examination, so they get career status. But there is no pressure from the Civil Service. It is a convenience or agreement that they have arranged with us.

Mr. RANKIN. Maybe I can help, Chief. Schedule A is an exemption from the regular civil service roster, is it not?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And the register is a list of employees from which you have to otherwise select Government employees if they are not exempt by reason of their positions, is that correct?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Representative FORD. In other words, Civil Service Commission has set up for the White House detail all inclusive——

Mr. ROWLEY. Not necessarily for the White House detail, Mr. Ford. For the Secret Service—to allow us to get the type of individuals that we want for both criminal investigation and protective work. Because if you say exclusively for the White House detail, the fellow might not be equipped for the White House detail.

Representative FORD. In other words, every person recruited by Secret Service for any capacity is recruited in the first instance under schedule A.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; if he hasn't—if he is not on the register for civil service. We first go to the Civil Service, when we want to select somebody, to see if there is anyone on there that meets our qualifications. And then, if not, then we hire them under schedule A, which is sort of a blanket exemption.

Representative FORD. But I gather from what you have said, or I think you are intimating that most of your recruiting actually is from colleges, and they are under schedule A.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; yes, sir. Most of them from your State, sir—Michigan State University.

Representative FORD. It is a fine school.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is where it started, actually. They were the first ones. Now we also recruit on the west coast, in California, they have terrific schools out there.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I don't think you covered the Bolden matter as to whether you had an investigation made. Did you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I did, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you find out anything about the conduct of your agents?

Mr. ROWLEY. I found out there was no truth to the charges of misconduct. There were 11 charges lodged against us.

One charge, the ninth charge, a part of it was true. The boys did contribute for food. In other words, up there in Hyannis, when they are up there for a week, or a weekend, they would be assigned to a house, which economically was beneficial to them. One shift, and some of the drivers would be in this house. This house was in a remote area from the shopping area and so forth. So they agreed when they arrived there to contribute, to buy food for breakfast, it being an 8 to 4 shift. Eight to four meant they would have breakfast there and dinner.

Mr. RANKIN. What do you mean by that, Chief? Did they get a certain house and were able to live together there to reduce their expenses?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And then they each contributed to that common expense?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And did someone cook for them?

Mr. ROWLEY. One of the agents who enjoyed it as a hobby cooked the meals for them, while the others took care of the dishes.

Mr. RANKIN. They did contribute to supporting that?

Mr. ROWLEY. They contributed to supporting that, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Was there criticism of that action?

Mr. ROWLEY. There was criticism of the action to this extent: That when they went shopping they bought two or three cases of beer which they had available in the icebox when the men came off duty in the evening.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, were they on a travel status or subject to——

Mr. ROWLEY. Not on travel status under our regulations. They could be there a week, and they would be working their 8 hours. They were not working any longer than their 8 hours. It was comparable to their assignment here in Washington.

Mr. RANKIN. So it was really a summer White House position?

Mr. ROWLEY. Summer White House is what we called it.

Mr. RANKIN. And did you investigate the charges to see whether they were valid?

Mr. ROWLEY. I investigated. This portion was correct. There was some substance to that portion.

He also said he was left on post for a period of 2 hours and wasn't relieved. That an agent had used this time to take care of his private car. We established there was no agent up there who had a private car.

Further, we established that he was left on post because according to our arrangements it was routine that whenever the President went out for a cruise, the agents on the outer perimeter at the time would remain on duty, and the agents in the inner perimeter would accompany the President on the cruise in the followup boat. Naturally, when they were out on the boat, there was no one available to start what we call the push, to rotate the men from one post to another. In other words, in the White House or any place where we establish posts, every half hour one man starts from the office and starts making the push. The first man is relieved and he relieves the next one, so there is no monotony on their jobs. They each have a different area. They are conversant or acquainted with each and every phase of the physical area. But because he was on one post, and not relieved, he complained.

So the next day, to bend over backwards, and show there was not any prejudice, the agent in charge took him on the cruise, so he would not feel he was being ignored.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, from your investigation, did you find any violation at Hyannis of the regulations of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you been informed of any other claims that Secret Service agents had been violating the regulations while on duty?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; I haven't been informed of any others. And it seems in the last few days or few weeks we have been getting complaints that we haven't had in many years. And I think, as I mentioned earlier, because of the fact that we are very careful with the type of men we screen, their record has been above reproach over the years. They have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner. My files are replete with commendations on behalf of the agents wherever they have traveled and worked with committees and individuals in connection with Presidential travels, both here and abroad, which testifies to the impression that they have made.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you ever had a Secret Service agent indicted or a complaint filed against him, a criminal complaint, prior to this time?

Mr. ROWLEY. This is the first time I remember anything like this happening since I have been with the Secret Service.

Representative FORD. Mr. Rankin, I don't recall Chief Rowley saying precisely what the reprimands were specifically for these violations of the regulations in this one instance.

You spoke highly of their background, and you spoke very high in their praise. But I did not hear what reprimand, if any, had actually been lodged against them.

Mr. ROWLEY. There was no reprimand. You are talking about the current thing?

Representative FORD. I am talking about the Dallas trip.

Mr. ROWLEY. I stated in considering what would be an appropriate punishment at the time, I felt that these men, by their conduct, had no bearing on the assassination of the President in Dallas. That to institute formal punishment or disciplinary action would inevitably lead the public to conclude that they were responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy. I did not think in the light of history that they should be stigmatized with something like that, or their families or children. And, for that reason, I took the position that I did.

Representative FORD. So there was no official reprimand or disciplinary action?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you talk to the agents, to indicate and make it plain to them that this was a violation of the regulations?

Mr. ROWLEY. I talked to some of the agents, as did my inspector at the time, who interviewed each and every one of them.

Mr. RANKIN. And I think the Commission would be interested in whether you can be assured, or assure them that the action you took was sufficient so that this would not happen again.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I am confident that it would not happen again, Mr. Rankin.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us why you think so?

Mr. ROWLEY. Because they realize the seriousness of their action.

Initially I can understand the situation—they thought they were going for a dinner, buffet, and they got into the place and it wasn't there.

I talked personally with the agents there, and they just thought while they were there they would have a drink. It was one of those situations.

The important thing was that it was pointed out to them this was wrong, this was a violation. These men are young men with futures, they realize the true situation, innocent as they may have seemed to think it was.

But I am quite confident that we will not have a repetition of that.

And in talking to Mr. Behn—I am confident, too, in him—I know that he will see to it that they are well supervised.

Mr. RANKIN. When they are out on a trip of this kind, Chief Rowley, as I understand your regulations, it is understood by the regulations and by the Secret Service that they are on duty all the time—that is, subject to call?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And even though it is late in the evening or they had gone to bed in the early hours of the morning, they could be called to go on duty and perform their responsibility of taking care of the President or the Vice President, or whoever they are charged with; is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. So that do they understand that when they are out on that kind of duty, they are subject to call at all times, and anything they do contrary to

regulations is a violation, because they are subject to the call and must be ready at any moment to perform their duties.

Mr. ROWLEY. They certainly do, because there have been situations, whether or not they have had it with the Kennedy administration I don't know—but I know there have been situations where we have moved fast, all hours of the night. I remember one instance, that has never been disclosed—as Mr. Dulles knows, you never advertise your successes, you just get the other things—that I would like to give you as an example off the record, to answer your question, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Chief, it seems to me that on an assignment of that kind, to be alert at all times is one of the necessities of the situation. And I just wonder if you believe that men who did what these men did, being out until early morning hours, doing a little—even a small amount of drinking—would be as alert the next day as men should be when they are charged with the tremendous responsibility of protecting the President.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we checked on that, Mr. Chief Justice, and the agent in charge reported that they were in good physical condition. I don't condone these late hours; no. This is not a rule. This case is an exception. However, because of the activities of any travel such as the Presidents today make from one place to another, to maybe seven States in a weekend, there is constant going.

I don't condone this at all. But these men are young. They are of such age that I think that they responded in this instance adequately and sufficiently as anyone could under the circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am thinking of this. As you go along in the motorcade, you have men who are scanning the buildings along the way, don't you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they have submachineguns in one of the cars.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; for security reasons, I would like to—we don't have machineguns now, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I just thought I heard that from the record here, that they had some kind of guns.

Mr. ROWLEY. They had a weapon, a new weapon; yes, sir.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, whatever it is.

Now, other people, as they went along there, even some people in the crowds, saw a man with a rifle up in this building from which the President was shot. Now, don't you think that if a man went to bed reasonably early, and hadn't been drinking the night before, would be more alert to see those things as a Secret Service agent, than if they stayed up until 3, 4, or 5 o'clock in the morning, going to beatnik joints and doing some drinking along the way?

Mr. ROWLEY. If I remember that witness' testimony—and that was one of the first statements that he made—that witness was with his wife, and he happened to look up there, and I think he said, "There is a man with a rifle, it is a Secret Service man," and let it go at that. He didn't inform any of the authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. No; nobody did. But I say wouldn't an alert Secret Service man in this motorcade, who is supposed to observe such things, be more likely to observe something of that kind if he was free from any of the results of liquor or lack of sleep than he would otherwise?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, yes; he would be. But then, on the other hand, Mr. Chief Justice, in some instances the men come in from a trip at 1:30 in the morning, which there have been cases on travels that I have made, and have to be up at 3:30 or 4 o'clock, and out in time for a 5 o'clock departure. Then you go all that day until 1 or 2 o'clock the next morning. This is what has happened in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about the past. We are talking about nine men here who were out until rather unusual hours of the morning.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were to be on duty the next day.

The next day—or if not sooner.

The next day they were supposed to be alert to anything that might occur

along the line of march. Don't you think that they would have been much more alert, sharper, had they not been doing these things?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; but I don't believe they could have prevented the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a substantial violation of these rules to do a thing of that kind?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir—on the basis of this section here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Now, Chief I noticed, also, in reading some of the reports that three of these men whom you speak of, were actually on night duty, protecting the life of the President. And around 4 o'clock in the morning, when they were protecting him at the Texas Hotel, they said that they had a coffee break, and they went from the hotel over to the beatnik joint. Now, is that consistent with your regulations?

Mr. ROWLEY. In this case, I talked to these three agents. They were relieved at different times—because their posts are in the corridor of a stuffy hotel——

The CHAIRMAN. Of the what?

Mr. ROWLEY. The corridor that they were on post outside the President's suite was a stuffy one, and they went downstairs to get a breath of fresh air. And they walked—it was a block—and out of curiosity they went into this place. One fellow looked in and left, he didn't buy any coffee. Another fellow went in and felt, I suppose, when he went in that he would buy a cup of coffee. But they were on what we call reliefs, the same as we relieve them around the White House. There are only so many posts, but you have a group of men in one of the rooms of the hotel where they are available, like an alert squad, and they relieve everyone on post every half hour. It is a part of the rotation of positions we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any regulations concerning where they shall remain when they are relieved for this short period of time?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They can go any place they want?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not any place. They usually stay within the immediate confines. That is understood. The hotel or the residence.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they didn't do that here, did they?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They went to the beatnik joint.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is that consistent with their duty?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it is not consistent or inconsistent with their duty. But as they explained to me, they wanted to get a breath of fresh air. If they are at a residence in a remote place, and they want to walk around the area, they might walk maybe a city block or so, which is what they do on a lot of these assignments—particularly in hotels. This was not an air-conditioned hotel.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem to me that a beatnik joint is a place where queer people of all kinds gather anyway, and that the mere fact that these men did leave their post of duty might be an indication to someone that the President was not being protected, and might leave an opening for them to go there and try to do something.

Mr. ROWLEY. They were relieved, Mr. Chief Justice. They didn't leave their post of duty. They would not leave their post of duty until they were relieved by someone.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understood the report, they said they left for a coffee break.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, it is an expression. They left to have coffee, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any place for coffee in the hotel?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think there was a coffee shop in the hotel; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the only place in town, as I understood, from the reports, outside of the beatnik place they could. But they went down to the beatnik place. Did they do that by prearrangement with the other agents?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; it was curiosity on their part. They hadn't seen the other agents. There was no arrangement of any nature at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But they did there meet other agents?

Mr. ROWLEY. They saw other agents—those that were in the place at the time they looked in. I think they came in after most had left, though.

Mr. DULLES. Were these men off duty for the night or were they going back on duty immediately after this break?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; they were on duty. They were the midnight shift, Mr. Dulles, from 12 to 8 a.m.

Mr. DULLES. They were going back on duty?

Mr. ROWLEY. They were going back on duty; yes, sir; in 10 minutes, 15 minutes.

Mr. DULLES. I see.

Representative FORD. And they did go back on duty and relieve somebody subsequent to this?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give the Commission a letter as of May 5 of this year in regard to this Dallas matter concerning the Press Club and the Cellar?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that letter correct in regard to what happened as far as you know?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And did you make available to the Commission the statements of each agent signed by the agent?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I think you said Dallas. Did you not mean Fort Worth?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes—it should be Fort Worth, I am sorry. Thank you.

I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1019 and ask you if that is your letter of May 5 that we have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1019 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1019.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1019, was received in evidence.)

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, I notice in the report that was made that while your inspector found that no one—no member of the Secret Service was intoxicated at the club—but that there was someone connected with the group who was intoxicated.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that also wasn't a violation of that portion of the rule which says, "In interpreting the words 'excessive' and 'improper' slight evidence tending to indicate unusual or questionable conduct will be considered proof that the use of liquor has been improper or excessive. Association with others who drink to excess will be considered as an indication of using more than a moderate amount of liquor."

Did you call that to the attention of your people?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir. They ran into that individual as they were entering—two agents ran into this individual as they were entering the Fort Worth Club.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1020, and ask you if that is a document that you had prepared for the Commission.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1020 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that includes, under capital letter A, the transmittal from Inspector McCann; B, the report of the investigation by Inspector McCann; C, the Drew Pearson article?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. D, the statements of the supervisors; and, E, the statements of the special agents; F, the statements of witnesses; and, G, the memorandum of May 19, 1964, by Agent Sorrels, is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. And are those various documents a part of the official report by the Secret Service to the Commission of this matter?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1020.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1020, was received in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. Off the record, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Chief, I notice—I have read this report. At any place in here, did any of your investigators, Inspector McCann, or your special agents, or anybody else, indicate that there had been any violation of any kind on the part of your people, or particularly any violation of this section 10, chapter 1, page 7 of the Secret Service manual?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think what happened in this instance, we responded to the broadcast of Mr. Pearson and his charge that the men were inebriated. We were primarily concerned with that at that time. And to get the statements from the men. But I do know that in the course of his interviewing of these individuals at the time, and taking their statements, he impressed upon them the fact that there was a violation.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any report made to the Commission to the effect that there was any violation of——

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; unless it is contained in this document here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not seen anything in there. It seems to me they were all given a complete bill of health. And I just wonder if that is quite consistent with the facts that the Commission should have.

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; as I said earlier, we don't condone their actions, nor do we try to belittle the violation. But in the circumstances, I took the decision that I thought right in view of the tragedy and so forth. In any other circumstance it would have been entirely different. But as I said earlier, I don't think that these people should be blamed for the tragedy that happened at that time, and that any attempt to assess formal punishment would in the light of history stigmatize them for the rest of their life, as well as their families.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I plan to leave that subject now—unless there is some further question.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Very well.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, will you tell us whether you learned anything about the preparations in Dallas for the visit of the President on November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I read the report of Special Agent Lawson, who was designated as the advance agent for that visit.

Mr. RANKIN. And do you know that that report has been furnished to us?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. A copy of it.

And have you examined it to determine whether it is accurate, as far as you can determine?

Mr. ROWLEY. It is accurate; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I have no corrections to make, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Were you—are you satisfied, now examining that report, with the manner in which the advance preparations for the trip of the President were handled?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The report follows the standard procedure that we have exercised over the years, and in many of the trips we had taken with the late President. He covered everything with the police and all that we have normally covered on such visits.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have enough agents at that time to perform the required duties in connection with this trip for both Dallas and the other cities in Texas to be visited?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we never have enough agents for the activities that the President today is engaged in. We draw from the field to supplement or augment the agents from the White House detail. We move the agents from one point to another where we can—particularly in the area of the advance men.

But in Dallas we had sufficient agents with prior experience in Presidential protection who assisted Mr. Lawson in the advance preparations.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you furnish to the Commission a statement of the preparations that were made for the trip?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that included the various protective activities, did it?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1021, and ask you if that is the report you made in regard to the trip.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1021 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any corrections or additions that you care to make to it?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1021.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1021, was received in evidence.)

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, I have wondered about this question. Some months before Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been handled very roughly in Dallas. Did you make—did your people make any investigation as to that group that caused that disturbance for him, to see if there might be some possibility of the same thing happening to the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not immediately at the time of the incident that occurred to Mr. Stevenson, but when the advance man came down, that was one of the things that we assigned a local agent to inquire into, to ascertain the hard core of that group, if you will, that were responsible for stimulating that activity. And he contacted an informant, and with the local police, who are members of a special squad that are involved in this kind of activity, they went and identified through pictures, which they saw in the newsreel, the principal members. They had photographs made, and they issued them to the agents on their visit there, to be on the lookout for these men as potential troublemakers.

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Did they do the same thing concerning the incident that Vice President Johnson had a year or so before that?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; not at that time. That was more or less in the heat of a political campaign. I don't think that was a similar type of activity.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

But you did do it with the Stevenson matter?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you make a report to the Commission with regard to the publicity concerning the trip of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is Commission Exhibit No. 1022 that report?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1022 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to make any additions or corrections of that letter?

Mr. ROWLEY. Of that letter? No.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1022.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1022, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, could you inform the Commission about the advance publicity concerning trips of the President to various parts of the country? There has been the question raised as to whether that is a threat to the President,

and might make the work of the Secret Service and others who are doing protective work more difficult.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have found that it is. And we always consider it as a potential threat in that it might give someone the opportunity who had any plans, whether it be an individual as in this case, or a group, to select an area, if they knew what the route was, or conduct a reconnaissance, if you will. I have always been opposed to it, and I have always tried to prevail upon the staff of the various Presidents who might be responsible for the release, not to release it too far in advance.

Mr. RANKIN. Could you tell the Commission what the problem is in that regard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, in this regard, it is a political thing, and the President cannot be contained in a vacuum. If he wants to go out and meet the people under our form of government, he will in his own way. Each and every President has his own thoughts and methods as it pertains to these visits, and the need for publicity. This trip in Dallas was an opportunity for the people to see the President, as are the trips of any President. I remember well when President Truman started his trip across the country in June 1948, the purpose being to get the feel of the people and let the people see him at the time.

And it was then, as a result of that trip, that he determined he would run for reelection. That I know of my own personal knowledge.

But these are the things that are hard in security, as far as developing a close screen on the President.

Mr. RANKIN. Is the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service under your direction, too?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; that is part of the White House area, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you familiar with the testimony of Robert Bouck concerning that Section?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether that accurately describes the conduct of that Section?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, at that time. The Section was established by us some 20 years ago, and primarily to process threats, obscene letters and suicide notes. Over the years, and particularly during the last 9 years, the work has evolved to a point where we find that it requires further expansion.

It had a broad and general concept in the criteria of what it needed for Presidential protection in knowing what risks were about the country.

Mr. RANKIN. Did the Secret Service have a written communication to other intelligence agencies as to the criteria for information that they sought?

Mr. ROWLEY. At that time?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; at that time.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it was more or less of an informal arrangement that we had with the agencies, as we developed the Section.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell the Commission what the standard was that you told the agencies you would like to have information concerning?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, if there were any threats to the President, we were interested in being informed about it. We were in touch with the FBI, the CIA and others.

In the basic schools of the Treasury, and through coordination, our agents in charge of the areas, in coordination meetings, would inform representatives of other agencies of the type of people that we were interested in, the nature of the threats that we asked that they refer to us.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know that this standard only developed about 400 names from all over the country?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that it produced none in the immediate Dallas vicinity?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, have you done anything about that standard since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have had a complete reexamination of the Protective Research Section.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you describe——

Mr. ROWLEY. We infused new blood. We have asked the Rand Corp., the Research Analysis Corp., the President's Scientific Advisor, and the medical people for a study of this, and we are in constant consultation. We have brought in experienced agents who now are processing, evaluating, and analyzing all reports we receive, and indexing the information as we receive it from the various agencies. We have more recently issued and forwarded to the intelligence community in Washington our criteria at the present time regarding what we would ask them in a more formal manner. This is the beginning of what we hope to be a more thorough and practical approach to this problem.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief, I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1023, dated June 17, 1964, and ask you if that is a communication from you to the Commission describing the new criteria.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1023 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Does it accurately state that criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1023.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1023, was received in evidence.)

Mr. ROWLEY. If I may read——

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us the gist of the new criteria, and what the difference is as you conceive it from the old standard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, if I may do this. We have sent this criteria to the intelligence agencies that we think would be of help to us, with a covering letter in which we say that studies are now underway, "by which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view towards amendments if required. We will appreciate your cooperation and suggestions concerning these guidelines, so that the person of the President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and resources."

Another thing today now that we have to concern ourselves with, is that we get an expanding file of information.

Mr. RANKIN. Has that happened since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well yes; we have gotten some 9,000 reports on the members of the Communist Party from the FBI. At this time we have read and evaluated and catalogued them and indexed them. There has been a small percentage that have been to date of interest to us. But this is the beginning. And except for the indexes, we are more or less current as a result of that. This is through the long hours and hard work by the new group that I brought in to develop this department.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, how is the standard described in Exhibit No. 1023 different from the prior standard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have always had the basic standard. The other standard was the threat to harm or embarrass the President, however, this time we added three factors.

Mr. RANKIN. And these are in addition to the threat of harm to the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. All right, proceed.

Mr. ROWLEY. The interest of the individual or the organization, capabilities of the individual or the organization, and the activities of the individual or organization. The interests of the individual or organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria, but must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.

"The interest must be towards the President, or others named, or other high Government official in the nature of a complaint, coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. After the interest phase of the criteria is met, then the activity which encompass previous history, that is, mental instability, history of violence and the capability of the individual or organization for

furthering this interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service. In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating to each of the three factor criteria."

Mr. RANKIN. Now, is the Secret Service operating under the standard or criteria described in Exhibit No. 1023 at the present time?

Mr. ROWLEY. At the present time, it is, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And when did that become effective?

Mr. ROWLEY. That became effective in the last 3 weeks as we developed and explored and examined the many reports that we were receiving.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, the language that you read into the record, where you invited comment and suggestions from the various other agencies to whom you sent communication, what did you mean by that? Is that asking them for their ideas so that you may further change the criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Where we may get in a position later on to break it down into categories. In other words, if every agency forwards and inundates us with many reports—say we expand to 3 million, obviously, the whole intelligence family could not cope with that. You have to get it down to a workable number. On the other hand, if you try to restrict the categories too much, then you find yourself in a position that you may miss another Oswald, and then the utilities of your file are of no consequence. So you have to try to reach the level in between there where it is going to be practical for us to react or develop the type of risks that we think should be covered by our organization in the protection of the President of the United States.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you doing anything about the use of equipment that might help you to secure information about any particular locality the President was going to travel to more readily?

Mr. ROWLEY. In connection with the PRS?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have conferred with the IBM. Can I go off the record on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, you have described off the record certain matters that involve the security of the country and cannot be made public. But can you tell us whether you have done anything in the past to try to improve your methods in testimony that can be made public?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I have tried to secure in the appropriations funds to enable us to procure the equipment and personnel that we thought would be necessary.

With the approval of the Congress, we were able 2 years ago to secure funds to enable us, in our check forgeries program, to try to adapt the characteristics of handwriting to an ADP processing program. We are hopeful this will work out. And we have used the Bureau of Standards to assist us in this program. We have prints out and have programmed part of the operation.

Now, it was my thought that if we succeeded in that area, we could also apply it to PRS. So we are working quite hard on this other area. And I knew the need would be eventually for us to get into the PRS stage on the electronic machine situation.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you know that we had asked Mr. Bouck when he testified if he could inform us at a later date about people who were in institutions or otherwise might be dangerous, and with regard to whom you asked that the Secret Service be notified, so that they could make adequate protection for the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know how many such cases you now have?

Mr. ROWLEY. Approximately a thousand.

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell the Commission what your practice was for the Secret Service concerning the route of the motorcade at the time of the assassination—that is, whether you made inspection of adjacent buildings?

Mr. ROWLEY. At that time, and prior to that time, except for the inaugura-

tions in Washington, and other parades, involving the visit of foreign dignitaries in Washington, in which the President would ride in the motorcade with the head of state, where we had ample time to make these surveys, we had never conducted on trips out of Washington surveys of this nature. I have here a statement of the conditions that prevailed in Dallas as well as other areas—if I may read this.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. "Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.

"In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for a motorcade of 10 miles, including many blocks of tall commercial buildings, is not practical. Nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.

"In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot."

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I will ask you not to describe any procedure, because of security considerations, but I would like to have you tell on the record, as I think it is proper, whether there has been a change in this regard in the procedures of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. There has been a change in this regard.

Mr. RANKIN. I will not make an inquiry about that, unless the Commission wishes to go into it off the record.

Representative FORD. Is it my understanding that the Commission has such documents that we could analyze ourselves as to these changes?

Mr. RANKIN. I don't think we have any report of this.

Representative BOGGS. Why can't we get it off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question with regard to Exhibit No. 1023?

This, as I understand it, is the new specifications with regard to persons with respect to whom you wish to have alert information.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. It is called, "U.S. Secret Service Protective Information Guidelines." The top of page 2 of this exhibit is a paragraph that reads, "The interest"—and that is the interest of the suspect, I assume——

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. "The interest must be towards the President, or others named,

or other high Government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance real or imagined."

I wonder if you could explain that a little more? I ask this question because I have been studying the previous assassinations a good deal. And in many of these cases, it seems to me this definition would not have covered the assassin. That is, there has been in some cases opposition to government, opposition to people in authority, but there has been no expressed hatred toward or animus against a particular President. And I was wondering whether this went too far on a definition to meet your purposes.

Mr. ROWLEY. This is a beginning, as I indicated to you here. We hope to improve it. But this is one of the things where we want to include the Oswald-type individual.

Now, Oswald wrote to the Governor intimating that he would use whatever means was necessary to obtain the change of his undesirable, or as he called it, dishonorable discharge. All legal means had been used in his case, where the Navy Review Board had examined it and came to a decision.

And this is an example of what we were trying to include in the area of this type of individual. Now, the other people——

Mr. DULLES. But that was not a threat directed against the President. That was directed against the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but then, on the other hand, they transfer the threats. I am quite sure that the Congressmen here get many threats, and that sometimes they may not come off. But these people are obsessed.

You take the individual that attempted the assassination of the late President Roosevelt in Miami that time. His original purpose was to shoot President Hoover. But then when he heard Roosevelt was there, he transferred.

Now, I remember a situation involving a member of Truman's staff, where a fellow stalked this man at his home. And finally we got into the case on his request. We satisfied ourselves that he wasn't a real threat to him—but we picked up the paper a year later and found out he shot at an assemblyman in Staten Island. So if they make a threat or something like this, even though it is against the Government as a group, or have some grievance, they transfer it—particularly, to the President. They use that father complex, as indicated in the research work that these different agencies have submitted to us.

Representative FORD. Under these criteria, which you are now following, Oswald would have been designated? Is that your judgment?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I had some questions about that in reading it. That did not occur to me, because Oswald had never expressed any antagonism toward the President, as far as I know, up to this time—the President personally, or even afterward.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but under this criteria he would. Namely, he had the interest because of the letter he wrote to Governor Connally. The activity, because he was a defector, and he demonstrated for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. The capability, because he traveled, and he had knowledge of firearms.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; but those do not come, it seems to me, within this definition. Maybe I interpret it differently than you. The last interest Oswald showed was directed toward General Walker. It wasn't against—of course, that wasn't known.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it wasn't known but the first interest of this type was the letter to Governor Connally as Secretary of the Navy, in which he said he would use whatever means he could to correct that discharge, inferring, of course, that he would apply illegal means if he could.

Representative FORD. If we only had the letter that he wrote to Governor Connally, and no other information, how would that threat, or that course of action, become known to the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. It would not, unless it was furnished by the Navy Department or Secretary of the Navy's office.

Just like you gentlemen get letters that never come to our attention. But

you might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.

Representative FORD. Would this criteria be circulated among the 50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are received against a Governor, then the Governor's staff in that particular State would so notify the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. It could. In this case it would be a help. But they refer all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.

Representative FORD. The State?

Mr. ROWLEY. The Governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this system would bring it to our attention.

Mr. DULLES. I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, this is something—actually, we have to develop something, and we have to, if you will, have a crash program; we are working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I indicated earlier.

(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1024, and ask you if that is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements that you have just described from the various agents about the events at Dallas.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024 for identification.)

(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1024.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1024, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back of the car?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1025, and ask you if that is your transmittal letter with the statements attached.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1025.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1025, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in making these statements was understood by you or properly could have been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility about the protection of the President.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I would not so construe that, Mr. Rankin. The agents would respond regardless of what the President said if the situation indicated a potential danger. The facilities were available to them. They had the rear steps, they would be there as a part of the screen. And immediately in the event of any emergency they would have used them.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know why there was no one riding on the rear step at the time of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. From normal practice, based on my own experience over the years, I know that the agent in charge in the front or any experienced agent,

who is either on the right front or the left front of the followup car, without being told, will react immediately. If he determines there is a situation here, there is a big crowd, and so forth, he will immediately leave that followup car.

Now, the running board on the followup car has an important place in the setup. It is a much better place to be than on the rear step if you see a situation, and you want to move fast. Suppose someone is coming toward the President's car—you would be surprised how fast you are propelled by jumping off that car, and you are in motion fast, where you can either tackle somebody, or block him or anything like that. So this is an important part. You cannot do that from the rear step of the President's car.

Now, when the agents are in a heavy crowd, as we have been abroad, in places where we had to run, say, for 10 miles alongside the car, agents could stand on the rear steps and screen the President. In addition, there would be agents on the side, protecting him on his right side. The crowd is surging close to him, you are bouncing off the car, and the people, trying to ward them off from touching the President.

After a period of time you are weary. But with the aid of this step, you can be replaced by the agent there, and he takes your place until you revive yourself, and you are acting as a screen.

Now, if the thing gets too sticky, you put the agent right in the back seat, which I have done many times with past Presidents.

When you come out of a big crowd like that, and the crowd is sparse, and it doesn't look like there is a potential danger, you return to the followup car to be ready for any emergency in the event somebody darts across.

In this instance, when the Presidential car was coming toward the freeway and the people were sparse, the men at some point came back to this car. This is one of the automatic operations, if you will, that the agents respond to. So it wasn't until the first shot was fired that, as I said earlier, Hill had the opportunity to scan from his left to his right, that he saw the President—the action of the President. Then he responded immediately. That is why he got up to the President's car.

Mr. RANKIN. Has it ever been the practice of the Secret Service to have an agent ride all of the time on the back step?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it hasn't. Because there are times when you pick up your speed, for instance on a freeway. And when you pick up your speed, it is the most difficult thing on a step maybe 10 to 12 inches wide, and a grip, to stand up. And you would not be a very good screen going that fast, because you would have to bend down. That has happened to me, because I have been caught on it.

Now, I was in Costa Rica and worked the followup car. Whenever I was on a trip abroad, I would work the followup car to see how the agents work, and work myself, because it wasn't what you might refer to as a routine trip.

But the followup car conked out. The crowds were surging around the President's car. We had two men next to the President's car. I left the followup car immediately, from my experience, and jumped on the step, to the right rear of the President, and held onto the handgrip, and was there. And then when the man came back, I relieved him and took my position on the side—until, for a distance of a mile or two, until such time as the followup car got underway, and the other people came up. But you had to stay with the President under those circumstances.

So those are the different things that occur in a given situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, as I understand this, President Kennedy did not give any general instructions to the agents never to ride on his car. It was only in specific circumstances where for one reason or another he did not want them on there at that particular time.

Mr. ROWLEY. No President will tell the Secret Service what they can or cannot do.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Sometimes it might be as a political man or individual he might think this might not look good in a given situation. But that does not mean per se that he doesn't want you on there. And I don't think anyone with commonsense interprets it as such.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be—that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you anwered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they would?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out—we haven't gotten any reaction—we asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley——

Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no

indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Representative BOGGS. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times—he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.

Mr. ROWLEY. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security. And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual, whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or something like that.

Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn't like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?

Representative BOGGS. Well, that is right.

Mr. ROWLEY. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start going into individuals——

Representative BOGGS. And if I remember correctly, there has never been—we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the President of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. RANKIN. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. That was the only question I had.

Mr. DULLES. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go around and talk about it and threaten it.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.

As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to themselves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim. Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.

Mr. DULLES. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be done on that.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI. And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.

Senator COOPER. I understood that was the procedure before. But my question is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you would take protective measures?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, no, sir; not unless we had——

Senator COOPER. Since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just enunciated.

Senator COOPER. I would suggest—first, I understand there are not many defectors who have returned to the United States.

Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to

go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong convictions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about his mental processes.

I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities when he came back.

Mr. ROWLEY. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the investigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report. And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes. There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.

Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That you do guard the life of the President. And that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote. So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy about the methods you employ.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart anything we might set up.

Representative BOGGS. Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a few—we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947—I am not quite certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I communicated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you" and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation, when I was at the White House, with the FBI.

Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the person of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. You know of that, do you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that appropriation—a certain given figure—was to be used by the U.S. marshals to assist the Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appropriation act for the FBI?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I started to say, Mr. Rankin—subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that appropriation.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting to; is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; that has to do with the codification, wherein it states that the Attorney General will appoint—I think, in substance—officials for the protection of the President of the United States. And this is a feature in the codification of the law we object to, because the Secretary of the Treasury authorizes and directs the protection of the President.

Representative FORD. Is that a bill, Mr. Rankin, that is before the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Judiciary Committee?

Mr. ROWLEY. They are preparing it, and they asked for our opinions. It must be now. This is a month or so ago, Mr. Ford.

Mr. RANKIN. I think I can give the Commission the exact language. It is chapter 33 of the House rule that I have just described, and it is under section 534, and the words are: "The Attorney General may appoint officials"—and then in quotes below that, in (2) "to protect the person of the President" and—and then it deals with other matters.

Now, will you tell why you have an objection to that? Just briefly summarize it.

Mr. ROWLEY. Because of the long history of Presidential protection we have been directed—it has been under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department, authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. But this would confuse and be a conflict in jurisdiction. Conflicts would naturally arise in the future as to who had jurisdiction.

If anything happened like Dallas, we would get into an Alphonse and Gaston pantomine.

Mr. RANKIN. You would get into a jurisdictional dispute?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. And that is why you object?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. But as far as any provision that has been made historically for the FBI to have funds so they can supplement and assist you, you have no objection to that?

Mr. ROWLEY. No objection at all.

Representative FORD. Do you know how much in the way of funds have been utilized through that provision?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I would not know of my own knowledge, Congressman, because that would be under the jurisdiction of the FBI and the Budget Bureau.

Representative FORD. In other words, they don't take money that they get through their appropriation bill, and transfer it to the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. No.

Representative FORD. This is simply a provision which authorizes them to use whatever funds they get for this purpose?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I understand that regarding H.R. 4158, the Treasury and the Justice Department have agreed that the language may be changed so that it will read "Assist", is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And that is satisfactory?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. That is what we worked out.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, in connection with your protection of the President, have you drawn upon various people in the Government and consultants to assist you in regard to scientific problems?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; some 8 or 9 years ago, we evolved a relationship with the Defense Department—I think more specifically in the last 4 years—a relationship with the President's Scientific Advisor.

This is off the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Why, Chief?

Mr. ROWLEY. That has to do with national security.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, do you find in work of the Secret Service that you have need for scientific advice and consultation concerning problems that develop regarding the protection of the President, so that if you had some arrangement whereby you could have the assistance of either the President's Scientific Advisor

or consultation with independent consultants, it would assist and in fact be necessary to your work?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think it would be a great help, and it is necessary today, because under the crash program that we are endeavoring to undertake, I think it is important that we know, in Presidential protection, what the current devices are that are available and are efficient in connection with countermeasures against eavesdropping and other things that we have been researching over the years. But this is not necessary on a day-to-day basis, and it could be on an informal basis with other agencies. I think it is necessary to have somebody of that type, who is conversant with the subject, a trained expert, who knows precisely where to go.

We might spend a lot of time going around the paths, but by having an expert, he knows precisely the organization, the contracting company, what they have, whether it is suitable, whether it is efficient for our purposes.

Representative FORD. Mr. Rankin, is the letter of April 22, 1964, from Mr. Rowley to you with the enclosures a Commission exhibit?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; that has been offered. That is Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

Representative FORD. In this enclosure, Chief Rowley, on page 4, under subheading (c), the following is stated: "The Secret Service has no funds for research and very limited funds for the acquisition of protective devices. In the fiscal year 1964 budget, the Service requested $23,057 for two positions for technical specialists. The Congress did not make any appropriation covering this request, and it was repeated in the 1965 budget request, and has been included in the appropriation passed by the House several weeks ago."

Could you define more particularly what you had in mind for these so-called technical specialists?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; this was someone that knew something about electronics or electronic engineering for the sweeping of different places. We felt that to date we were utilizing the services of agents who primarily came with us on the basis of criminal investigation, and that, therefore, it was my feeling that we should have this type of expert.

As I said earlier, I realize the shortcomings and the requirements which we are operating under—and I was endeavoring to get the funds from Congress, the personnel that I thought were necessary, as well as the equipment I thought we should have, primarily to have this operation under control for us.

Now, I might say that the CIA has been most helpful. The equipment we used in the early days were from that organization and the State Department.

But now they have gotten so busy, as you well know, that they haven't got much time to assist us.

So that we feel we want to have our own equipment, our own experts, and people that know our work, and devote their time to it.

Representative FORD. When you talk about technical specialists here, you are referring to electronics specialists?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. You are not referring to a general research and development program, however?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; this confusion is why it was refused a year ago.

Representative FORD. Let me ask this, then, Chief Rowley. Would these technical experts, or technical specialists, have been on duty in Dallas on this particular trip if you had had the funds and had employed them?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; but they would have been employed in something entirely different.

Representative FORD. They wouldn't have had any relationship to the motorcade?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir. If I may go off the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us why you are going off the record?

Mr. ROWLEY. Because it involves national security.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Representative FORD. As I understand it, then, the deletion of these funds for

these technical specialists in fiscal year 1964 did not in any way handicap your operation in Dallas at the time of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; we have never said that. We are just saying that if we had the equipment—in other words, what I am trying to do, Mr. Congressman, is to move forward. And the only way I know, after a period of years, is to ask for a sum of money, but then my experience is that sometimes the Congress becomes alarmed. But this is a need that we have. And this is what I am trying to explain. This is an example of what we are trying to do, in equipment and manpower.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, or Mr. Rankin, I have to go shortly over to a session of the House. And since we are in the budget area, I think it might be well for the record to develop some facts concerning your budget—what they have in the past and what you are suggesting they might be in the future.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I have here a summary of the appropriation allocations as it applies to manpower and equipment, and the number of persons on the roll.

Representative FORD. Do you receive your appropriations in a lump sum or how do you receive Secret Service appropriations?

Mr. ROWLEY. I guess it is on a warrant. When the warrant is signed——

Representative FORD. Your budget is included as a part of the Treasury Department budget?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Now, do you have it in a separate part of the Treasury Department budget?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Is it specifically earmarked for the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. It is; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. It is a lump sum for the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. That is a public appropriation, it is made public?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Congressman Ford, if I may interrupt just a minute, I can ask Chief Rowley if Commission Exhibit No. 1028 is the one he just referred to in answer to your question about the budget.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1028 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. I then offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1028.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1028, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Exhibit No. 1028, Chief Rowley, does include in this—so it will be understandable to the Commission, the figures for your proposed budget of 1966, doesn't it?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And those are shown in that manner on the exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Is the figure we see here——

Mr. ROWLEY. This is what we call a tentative budget.

Mr. RANKIN. That has been presented to the Budget Bureau?

Mr. ROWLEY. It has not been presented to the Budget Office of the Treasury, which is the first step. Then it goes to the Budget Bureau, and then subsequently to the House and Senate.

Mr. RANKIN. You said it has not been.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; this is a tentative proposal that we have made.

Mr. RANKIN. At this stage, so we get the record clear—that is a consideration of what you think you should have, but it hasn't gone through the steps you have just described, is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. But it does not include—necessarily, until we complete our thorough examination—what our requirements will be under the new revisions of our organization. Particularly as it relates to manpower, we want to be sure that we have the proper justification. And so we hope by October or November to have a good estimate at that time.

Representative FORD. Well, the figure that is shown here for fiscal year 1965 is $7,550,000.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Is that the budget submission to the Congress?

Mr. ROWLEY. To the Congress; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And do you recall what the House approved in its version of the bill?

Mr. ROWLEY. $7,500,000. They cut $50,000.

Representative FORD. Do you recall what the reduction was predicated on?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I don't. I think it was just cut to a round figure.

Representative FORD. What is the footnote here which is entitled "Pending action by the Senate"? Is that a $669,000 increase?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Representative FORD. Is that a supplemental?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, no; we are just showing the increase—this has nothing to do with the $669,000. We show—this was passed by the House, but it is now pending in the Senate for approval. In other words, you have your markup or something, and then it hasn't been submitted to the House for a—to the Senate for approval.

Representative FORD. But there is an asterisk there.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; this is the 1965 budget. This figure that was reduced by $50,000, by the House. Now, it goes before—for a markup—it will be placed before the Senate for approval.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, when you say "this" it doesn't show on the record what you are talking about. So if you can tell what item on that Exhibit No. 1028.

Representative FORD. On the same line with the language, "Pending action by Senate," on the right-hand side is $669,000, which is labeled as an increase. That increase relates to what?

Mr. ROWLEY. It relates to the difference—the increase between 1965 and our proposed budget of 1966. The asterisk here relates to the 586 positions.

Mr. RANKIN. Is there any connection between those two? Chief Rowley, is there any connection between the asterisk, and the wording "Pending before the Senate," and the item on the right-hand column of the increase?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; it represents the increase that we are asking for in the 1966 budget.

Senator COOPER. You are not asking the Senate, though, to increase the House figure of $7,500,000, by $669,000.

Mr. ROWLEY. No, no; there is no connection between these increases. This should have been down here, where you explain what the asterisk is, where we have 586. Maybe it was put in the wrong position there. In other words, it is like a footnote. This is pending action—meaning that the House has passed the 1965 budget, but the Senate has yet to pass it.

Mr. RANKIN. But to clarify, there is no connection between the increased figure and the fact that it is pending before the Senate?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. It happens to be on the same line.

Mr. RANKIN. But there is no connection?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. What you mean is the House has passed an appropriation of $7,500,000, and the Senate has not yet acted upon it.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. The $669,000 is an increase that you hope will be voted in the next fiscal year.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. Do you present the budget yourself, or does the Secretary of the Treasury, or someone else in the Treasury Department—present and defend it?

Mr. ROWLEY. The Secretary presents the overall Treasury budget, but then in detail, we appear before the appropriations subcommittee ourselves to justify our request.

Mr. DULLES. The Secret Service justifies its own request in the overall budget of the Department of the Treasury?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Chief Rowley, on page 5 of Exhibit No. 1027, the statement is made, "In the fiscal year 1965, the Secret Service has requested funds for an additional 25 positions. The House of Representatives has included the requested funds in the Treasury-Post Office appropriation bill which passed several weeks ago. These funds will not be sufficient to take the additional measures which we believe are required. However, since the 1965 budget figures had to be submitted in November 1963, it was not possible to make specific and properly justified requests at that time. We should be in a position to do so in the fiscal year 1966 budget submission."

You are not saying that you won't have whatever additional personnel you need now, or from now until the beginning of fiscal year 1966, for the protection of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; we are not saying that. We are saying that in view of the circumstances of what happened in November, that this budget of 25 positions had already been submitted, and there was nothing you could do to take it back.

The 1966 budget was also prepared and submitted. But, as I explain later, in all consideration, we cannot at this time helter skelter say we need so many men, taking advantage of the tragedy. We want to experiment and develop what we need in protective research in the way of manpower and equipment, and what we need in the field, because necessarily we will have to have special agents added to the field to conduct any investigations on risks that may be forwarded to them.

Representative FORD. But if in the process of your analysis of your needs, you develop that you need more personnel, you need new devices, you need equipment of any sort whatsoever—you won't delay the submission of that request just because of the fiscal year budget coming up for fiscal 1966?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Because we do have, as you well know, supplemental and deficiency appropriation bills.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Representative FORD. So if you need something, you can request it of the Bureau of the Budget, and if it can be justified, it can be submitted to the Congress in one of the other forms besides the regular appropriation bills.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. Because now as I understand it the same committee handles the supplemental.

Representative FORD. That is correct.

Mr. ROWLEY. We are aware of that. That is what we would do when we arrive at what our requirements would be.

Representative FORD. We can have your assurance that if you come up with requirements, you won't wait for fiscal 1966 to make your submission.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, you are in the process of trying to arrive at your estimates of what you need in additional personnel and equipment and other assistance to make the protective services and the Secret Service in its work of protecting the President as efficient as possible, are you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are seeking the help and advice of people that you have named, such as the Rand Corp., and others?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And do you have any estimate now that you can give the Commission as to when you might have your estimates in that regard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I think, No. 1, with regard to the protective research, I think we need some expert there to assist us in developing our requirements, particularly in the criteria, on a full-time basis. We have assigned what we thought were sufficient men at this time to cope with the volume of work and reports that we have been receiving, which are now being received from the various organizations of approximately a hundred reports a day. So that we have cut down to a considerable point.

Now, following the evaluation and the processing of these reports, we will determine just what we actually need in the way of manpower.

Mr. RANKIN. You also have the problem of being able to get that material out once you have it, don't you?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. And this is the point that we have to develop with IBM, or, as I said initially, with the CIA.

Now, they have facilities that would be available to us, if it works.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are also inquiring into the question of the sufficiency of the number of agents you have for this area as well as other Secret Service tasks?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are going to present that to the Congress as soon as you have something definite that you can support?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right—in response to Congressman Ford's inquiry.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, I think the Commission would be interested in the requirements or standards that you have for agents. Do you require a college education now?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And are there any other conditions or standards that you would like to describe?

Mr. DULLES. May I inquire for one point? Is that a college education for the White House detail?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; that is for all the agents that we recruit for our work, for both criminal and protective, Mr. Dulles. We require a minimum academic achievement of 4 years of college or university, and preferably those who attend police administrative schools, where they have in their curricula subjects on science, criminology, and law. We find that these people are better adapted, they have an inclination, and they are interested.

But we do take people with B.A.'s and B.S.'s, because they, too, have been most satisfactory. But we find when we need to recruit the men, we go to these colleges with special courses. As I mentioned earlier we first started recruiting them from Michigan State, because that was one of the first universities with a police administration curriculum. And we found each and every one of them have been most satisfactory and have excellent records.

As a matter of fact, a good portion of them are agents in charge of our 65 offices throughout the country.

Mr. RANKIN. What do you do as a matter of procedure in assigning your agents? Do you keep them in Presidential protection, or do you shift them from that to other functions in the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, when they are first sworn into duty, we assign them to an office, so during the period, the first 6 months, you would call it inservice training, because we are not in the position that the FBI is where they take in, say, a given number of agents—let's set a figure at 30—and then they can start them immediately with their school of 12 weeks. We are not in a position to hire that many at a time. We are in a position to hire 10. So that after 6 months, 10 now, after the character investigations are completed, and then we may get 10 more later.

Then we send them to what we call the Treasury Basic School, after which we try to send them as soon as practical to our Secret Service School.

Now, sometimes a new man might be a year in the Secret Service, and during that period he is on probation, after which we determine through the agent in charge whether his service is satisfactory, and whether he will develop into an agent.

Mr. DULLES. Is the FBI School open to any of your respective recruits?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well——

Mr. DULLES. FBI Academy.

Mr. ROWLEY. The Police Academy would be if we had occasion to send them there, if there was something they could benefit from. We do send the White House Police to the FBI Police Academy, because that is more in connection with their police function.

Mr. RANKIN. How does your agent get into the Presidential protection?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, some of the agents have indicated in their personal history questionnaires submitted each year whether they wish to select an office of duty preference, and there are three offices listed. If an agent wants for one reason or another after a period of 3 years on the White House detail to make a request for a transfer, we consider which of the three offices he selected has a vacancy,

and we assign him to that office. Then we bring in one of the new men from the field service to replace him. We then train him in the protective work.

Necessarily, you have to have a nucleus. So there are also a number of men in supervisory positions who have been on the White House detail for 20 or more years.

Mr. RANKIN. But your theory is that they should be able to be trained so that they could be shifted to any part of the service?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. And it has this advantage: Once they are trained in Presidential protection, if for some reason the White House detail gets instructions that the President is going to fly to one of the cities, or some hamlet across the country, and we do not have time to get an agent aboard a plane and send him there, or maybe the Air Force has no plane available to transport him there, we pick up the phone and call an agent at the nearest place—and here is an agent that has been trained, he knows the mechanics of the operation, and the procedure, and he goes to work, and effectively lays out the arrangements.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, this Commission Exhibit No. 1028, which shows the budget and the positions, I think is helpful. But in the submission of the budget by the Secret Service to the Congress, they have a greater breakdown of their personnel setup.

I think it might be wise to include what they submitted to the Congress, or something comparable to it, because I think it is far more complete than this.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Representative FORD. And I think it might be helpful for the record.

Mr. ROWLEY. We do not disclose the number of men on Presidential protection.

Representative FORD. I understand that. But you are familiar with the presentation you might submit for your overall budget, including personnel?

Mr. ROWLEY. Right.

Representative FORD. Can that not be submitted for our record, just as it is submitted to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations?

Mr. ROWLEY. It is a matter of public record. But whether or not the tentative one, the 1966 can be, before the Budget Bureau sees it, is something else again.

Representative FORD. I would not expect that it would.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; but the others can be.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask leave to secure a copy of that and insert it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted when you obtain it.

Representative FORD. May I ask one other question, and then I have to leave?

In listening to the testimony, Chief Rowley, sometime ago, I was a little concerned—more than a little, I should say—with the process by which the man in charge of a Presidential trip undertakes his relationship with the local law enforcement agencies.

As I recall the testimony, the man in charge has contact with the local police and the sheriff's department and any other local law enforcement agency. But the impression that I gained was that there was no clear delineation of responsibility. They sat around, they talked about what this local law enforcement agency would do and what another one would do.

But it seems to me that a more precise checklist, a clear understanding, would be wholesome and better.

What is your reaction on that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, No. 1, in our revised Manual on Presidential Protection, this is part of the thing.

Now, I would hesitate to prepare a checklist for everybody, because you may be embarrassed to find it in the press some day, because of the activity of reporters around the police.

I do not want to downgrade any police department, but this is what happens through no fault of theirs. There are variations in different cities.

Now, I think what you are referring to, Mr. Congressman, is that they complained they did not have a sufficient notice of the route and so forth, so they could make the proper preparations. That is true. Neither did we have sufficient notice. Because they were going back and forth trying to establish—until they were told they had 45 minutes allotted to them for this route, and first our man had to go, which is a natural operation, to look over the route to

see whether or not it could be negotiated within that particular period of time.

Once establishing that it could, and the thing looked safe, then they notified the police and went over it with the police. And then with the police they indicated what they would like done here at intersections and so forth, and other features.

Now, it is true in most cases we ourselves like to get sufficient advance information, we like to send our men out in advance so they do not have to cope with these fast operations, because when a police department has sufficient notice of the route and so forth, then they have adequate time to get out instructions to their own police department—whether by precinct or by group commanders, and so forth. And this is what I think in this instance that they are complaining about.

Representative FORD. As I understand it, however, at the present time, and for the future, there will be a more precise procedure for the relationships of the Secret Service on the one hand and local law enforcement agencies on the other.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. That is set forth in your manual as presently revised?

Mr. ROWLEY. In our present revised manual.

Representative FORD. So that when your agent-in-charge goes to city X, he now has the procedures set forth for many to follow on, so there are no uncertainties, if that is possible?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. And you have to necessarily do that, because you have agents, as I said—as I cited an example where an agent had been trained in the White House, but you have to utilize his services, because you cannot get a regular White House man out there. He has this information, and he follows it accordingly. It is a check for him as well as for the police.

Representative FORD. Other countries have protection problems of their chief executive.

I am sure in recent months the French have had considerable problems in this regard.

Do you ever have an exchange of methods with other governments for your benefit or their benefit?

Mr. ROWLEY. We have been approached, Mr. Congressman, for instructions on security and so forth, but we, for reasons—for national security reasons, I would like to go off the record.

(Off the record.)

(At this point, Representative Ford left the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. DULLES. You have referred to the dry runs which you made in Dallas, and you usually make, I understand, to establish a route.

First I think you said you did this yourself, and then with the local police.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Do you have any reason to believe that those dry runs were observed by the President or known to the President, or received any publicity?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; they did not receive any publicity.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, you were referring a little while ago to the revised rules.

When did the last revision take place? Has it been since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. No.

The overall revision of the Manual of the Secret Service, was undertaken before I took office, and because it was delayed, I took it upon myself to assign a man to sit down 7 days a week, to bring this manual up to date. The overall manual has been completed. Now we have almost completed the revised advance manual.

The CHAIRMAN. And—but there has been—as yet there has been no revision since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; it is in the process.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the process of being done? Very well.

Senator COOPER. I would like to ask a question. I think you stated that you took part in the procedures and methods for the protection of President Kennedy when he was—prior to his visit to Dallas.

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. I thought you said that you participated in a dry run.

Mr. ROWLEY. Oh, no; I was describing what the advance agents do.

Senator COOPER. Anyway—you know what the agents of the Secret Service did in preparing for the visit of President Kennedy to Dallas?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. And you know what procedures they followed during the actual route of the motorcade on that day?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Now, reviewing those, is there any failure that you know about on the part of the Secret Service in those procedures or in the methods which they used on the day of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, would you tell us the salary scale for your agents for the first 2 years?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; we recruit an agent at grade GS–7, at $5,795.

Mr. RANKIN. How does that compare with the starting salary for the FBI?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think it is a difference of three grades. As I understand, the lowest FBI grade is GS–10.

Mr. RANKIN. $10,000.

Mr. ROWLEY. Grade 10.

Mr. RANKIN. What salary would that be?

Mr. ROWLEY. It might be—for example, GS–11 is $8,410. Now, it could be somewhere between $7,500 and $8,000.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you able to get at that salary the quality of men that you should for this kind of work?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; we have found to date that we have been able—we have been selective. And, of course, the fact that we have only appropriations for a limited number of men.

For example, today we have well over 40 men waiting to be accepted, with completed investigations, some a year or more. Sometimes when we put in requests for a given number of men, we want to put those men on at the beginning of the fiscal year, so we undertake to recruit them and complete their investigation, so that everything—the character and the physical is up to date—and we can put them on, if we get the funds precisely at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Mr. RANKIN. You recognize that your starting salary is not favorable in comparison with some police forces, do you not?

Mr. ROWLEY. I recognize that. But at the same time, we are guided by the Treasury law enforcement examinations, and the other Treasury investigative standards. But we are below some of the west coast police organizations, for example. They are well-paid and great organizations.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, what kind of a workload do your agents have on an average?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, at the present time we have a caseload of 110.1 cases per man.

Mr. RANKIN. How does that compare with other intelligence agencies?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I think—a satisfactory caseload per man per month is from 14 to 15 cases.

Now, I am quite certain that in other agencies it is a little more than that. But whether or not it is as high as ours at the present time, I have no way of knowing at this time.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you thing that is a handicap to your operation?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, it is a handicap. But I think it is testimony to the dedication and the industry of our men, that we are not complaining. We are conducting ourselves and performing our services for the Government to the point that even though we are understaffed, nevertheless we are not quitters, and we are carrying on the work within the responsibility entrusted to us.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you write the Commission a letter telling the history of the early development and growth of the Secret Service operation over the years?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Is Commission Exhibit No. 1029 that information that you gave us?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; this also included the White House police.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you examine Commission Exhibit No. 1029, and inform us as to whether or not any of that should not be included on the public record in light of the national security problem?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no objections, because in the years past—this is part of the public record. So I would not see any objection at this time.

(At this point, Senator Cooper left the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1029.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document was marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1029, and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you write us a letter with regard to proposed legislation, dated June 11?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is Commission Exhibit No. 1030 that letter that you wrote us with an attachment telling about possible legislative changes that you thought might be desirable?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document was marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1030.)

Mr. RANKIN. I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1030.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1030, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Can you briefly state the contents of the attachment to that exhibit, Chief Rowley?

You recall that it is a commentary on the suggestion of legislation about the assassination of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; it is a recommendation on the bills being proposed, that the assassination of a President or Vice President or possible successors to the Presidency be made a Federal crime.

(At this point, Senator Cooper reentered the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Currently there is such a law whereby when people of lesser rank in the Government are murdered, that is investigated by Federal agencies.

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell the Commission briefly what your idea is as to whether or not it would be helpful to have such a statute?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think today it would be helpful, because it would be a continuation of the present law, and it would be under Federal jurisdiction—because this is a Federal employee. And I think it properly should be under Federal statute. There would then be an opportunity particularly today in the case of the President or Vice President, for the investigation to be pursued immediately, and the assassin or groups of defendants to be interrogated as promptly as possible to develop and ascertain whether or not there is a conspiracy, and not wait as we have to do under the present law because of the State statute.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any suggestions in your proposal about who would have jurisdiction to investigate and report in regard to any violation of that law?

Mr. ROWLEY. Currently the Federal enforcement agencies—namely, the FBI—have the responsibility of conducting investigations, on most of the Federal laws in the country, and therefore it might properly be their responsibility in a situation like this.

However, we do have a reservation with respect to an attempt or threat on the President, because we would like to work out an agreement whereby we would jointly conduct an investigation because the threat phase of it has been under our jurisdiction, under section 3056, for many years. It ties in with our responsibility for protection of the President.

Mr. RANKIN. In connection with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, have you personally participated in working with regard to that, in supervision of that investigation?

Mr. ROWLEY. In the early stages when we assigned our men to inquire into

the background of Oswald and all. But then eventually, when the President authorized the FBI to conduct the investigation, we pulled out and only continued and finished up those reports that we initiated.

Mr. RANKIN. And since that time, after the FBI was given the authority to proceed with the investigation, you have cooperated with the Commission through the staff, your staff, in helping with various items of information from time to time. Is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, do you have any information of a credible nature that would suggest to you that Oswald was or could have been an agent or informant of any Federal agency?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no credible information of that kind: no, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Was he an agent or informant or directly or indirectly connected with the Secret Service in anyway?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not in any way. We did not know of him until the event.

Mr. RANKIN. From the way that the Secret Service employment is arranged, and the records are kept, and the payments are made, if he had ever been placed in any such capacity with the Secret Service, would it have come to your attention?

Mr. ROWLEY. It would: yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are certain that he never was hired directly or indirectly or acted in that capacity.

Mr. ROWLEY. He was never hired directly or indirectly in any capacity.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any credible information that would cause you to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent of any foreign country.

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no such credible information.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any credible information to cause you to believe that he was involved in any conspiracy in connection with the assassination, either domestic or foreign?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no credible information on any of those.

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any areas of the investigation of the Commission that you would suggest that further work should be done, as far as you know the work of the Commission?

Mr. ROWLEY. I do not.

Mr. RANKIN. From your knowledge of the investigation, do you have any opinion as to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in the killing of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. From what reports I have read, I would say that he was involved in the killing of the President, but I do not have complete knowledge of it.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any opinion from your knowledge of the investigation as to whether Mr. Ruby was associated with anyone else directly or indirectly in the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have incomplete knowledge with respect to Ruby. Consequently, I could not say, other than what I saw on television or read in the newspapers, whether he had any connections.

Mr. RANKIN. Is there anything in connection with the work of the Commission or what you know about our inquiry here that you would like to add to or suggest that the Commission do beyond what you know of it?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question?

Mr. Rankin asked you several questions. He asked you if you had credible information, which I think was a proper question. But may I ask if you have any information based upon any facts that you know or based upon any information given to you by persons who claim to have personal knowledge, that there were persons engaged in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no such facts, sir.

Senator COOPER. I address the same question as to whether you have any information that the killing of President Kennedy had any connection with any foreign power?

Mr. ROWLEY. I have no such information.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, any questions?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir: I have one general question.

that is what is uppermost in your mind. We have to be most correct about that, in any of the agencies, as you know.

Mr. DULLES. How much larger staff do you think you are going to have to have to cover that situation in the future?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I would not know until we see the volume of reports that we get that we have to refer to the field for investigation. Since we are processing them now, we have to wait to make that determination.

Mr. DULLES. Should you do field investigations as contrasted with the FBI—the FBI have a large number of people in a large number of cities throughout the United States. You do not have that?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; but on the basis of the criteria we discussed earlier, the FBI would give us the information, and if in our evaluation we determined that it should be referred to the field for investigation, particularly in the case of individuals, we would conduct our investigation, to determine whether this individual is a high risk to the President.

Now, where it comes to the group, this is something for the FBI to do, because it ties in with their responsibility for internal security.

Now, if there is a close connection between the two, then we would have to have a formal agreement. But because of our responsibility, and the fact that this is part of the work that we have to undertake, then we would conduct our own investigation, because we know what we are looking for.

Mr. DULLES. If the name of Lee Harvey Oswald had been submitted to you by the FBI, what would you, in the normal course, have done?

Would you have referred that back to them for investigation, or would you have carried on an independent investigation?

I am talking now if that name had been referred to you when you knew you were going to go to Dallas.

Mr. ROWLEY. If we knew we were going to go to Dallas and we had this present criteria, then we would investigate him.

Mr. DULLES. You would carry on the investigation?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I am through with Chief Rowley now—except I would like to ask him to supply a copy of the information about their appropriation request, and insert it with Commission Exhibit No. 1028. [The information subsequently furnished by the Secret Service was inserted in the record as a part of Commission Exhibit No. 1028.]

We have Mr. Carswell here. As you recall, there was some difficulty at one meeting about the testimony about what the Secret Service was doing in regard to the Speaker. And while he is here, I would like to straighten that record out.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. RANKIN. It will be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, I want to take this opportunity to thank you and the members of your Secret Service for the cooperation you have given to this Commission. They have been very diligent, very helpful, as you personally have been. And we appreciate it.

Mr. ROWLEY. Thank you, sir.

## TESTIMONY OF ROBERT CARSWELL

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carswell, you have been sworn, have you not?

Mr. CARSWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, if the Commission will bear with me just a minute, I would like to tell about my own conversation with the Speaker about this matter prior to his answering in regard to correction of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. After the matter came up before the Commission, I was asked by one of the Commissioners to see the Speaker, Mr. McCormack, and I did that at his office. And he informed me that the Secret Service and also the FBI had undertaken to try to give him protection because of his position in the line