

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Memorandum -- PRS Activities
in Relation to the Texas
Trip

Memorandum -- Procedure for
Handling Protective Research
Information and Subjects

U. S. Secret Service
Treasury Department

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 760

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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2

Memorandum

U. S. Secret Service

TO : Chief

DATE: Dec. 3, 1963

FROM : SAIC Bouck - PRS

SUBJECT: PRS Activities in Relation to the Texas Trip and the
Assassination of President Kennedy

On about November 8, 1963, PRS was officially notified of the itinerary for the proposed trip of President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson to Texas.

A clerical employee of this office immediately checked the trip index file for PRS subjects of concern in relation to the Texas trip. No cards were found in the file that would indicate the presence of any known seriously dangerous PRS subjects as residing in the Dallas area, nor in any other area in Texas where stops were scheduled except for Houston.

The file jackets on the two Houston cases were withdrawn and taken to the Acting ASAIC who reviewed them and directed that an alert be prepared. He also examined the cards in the check-up control box and found no other subjects in the areas involved that appeared to warrant including in the alert. On November 14, 1963, the above indicated clerical employee prepared an office memorandum advising the name of one PRS subject who had previously been referred to the interested offices and was still of concern, and furnishing identifying data on a new PRS subject who had not previously been included in the alert. The original of this memo was immediately transmitted to the White House Detail and a copy was mailed to the Houston Secret Service office.

Shortly after 1:30 p.m., November 22, 1963, PRS received word that President Kennedy had been shot. Information as to the identity of the assassin was unknown at that time. Early in the afternoon word was received that a Dallas police officer had been shot by a man named Lee Harvey Oswald, and that this man was a possible suspect in the assassination. A search of PRS files was made for any record of that name but none could be found. Other government agencies were contacted and by mid afternoon we began receiving information from these sources. By the time information from Dallas began to indicate that Oswald was probably the assassin we had received considerable background material on him from the other agencies. The processing and organizing of information received on the assassin and the assassination has been continuing from that time.

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- 2 -

When Oswald was murdered we again made a search of PRS files with negative results for any information on the murderer, Jack Rubenstein, alias Jack Ruby.

Robert I. Bouck

Robert I. Bouck
Special Agent in Charge

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COMMISSION EXHIBIT 760—Continued

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

U. S. Secret Service

TO : Chief

DATE: Dec. 3, 1963

FROM : SAIC Bouck - Protective Research Section

SUBJECT: Procedure for Handling Protective Research Information and Subjects

Information on persons of protective concern is furnished to PRS from many sources, such as:

(1) Mail, packages, and telephone calls received at the White House, the President's home, on trips, and so on. These are screened by White House employees and those that appear to be of protective interest are referred to the Protective Research Section, where they are further evaluated, and, if they meet prescribed criteria, are retained for processing in PRS.

(2) Unwelcome visitors.

(3) Information received or developed by Secret Service offices.

(4) Reports from other government agencies and officials.

(5) Reports from Police Departments and State or local sources.

(6) Phone calls, letters, etc., received directly in PRS.

When information is received in PRS it is searched against name index, location index, modus operandi index and other specialized locators, to associate the current data with any previous information relating to the identity and background of the person involved.

In the next stage of processing the document or information is carefully read and if it appears that any action is needed, it is referred to the appropriate field office for attention.

When the information indicates a serious security danger, the referral to the field is usually made immediately by telephone with a follow up of the associated documents being forwarded by mail. Airmail is used whenever warranted because of distance. Also, in cases where the dangers appear serious or the subject may be able to get to the place where the people we protect are located, an immediate "look out" warning is transmitted to all protective offices and details. When practical this alert is provided in writing along with pictures. If time is important or the principal protective details are out of Washington the alert is given to them immediately by telephone.

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COMMISSION EXHIBIT 760—Continued

Frequently reports that are significant are passed through the Special Agents in Charge of the protective details for their orientation, and the more important of these are circulated among the working agents. Where the information is involved or lengthy summary memos are prepared by the Protective Research Section and forwarded to the personnel engaged in physical protection. This procedure most frequently applies to groups and subversive activities, and is used as a means of orienting protective personnel on this type of danger. Alerting information on dangerous individuals is usually made available to personnel of the protective details and White House Police by means of the above-described "look outs."

Our field offices not only investigate the matters referred to them but try to eliminate or reduce the dangers by making arrests if laws have been violated, procuring hospital treatment if mental illness is involved, or soliciting the aid of local officials when appropriate. Every effort is made to handle known potentially dangerous persons in their own locality rather than allow them to travel to Washington or to other areas where the President might be.

At the completion of all protective investigations, if the subject has not been confined to an institution an evaluation of his potential danger is made. If he is evaluated as a potential danger he is scheduled for periodic check ups. Such check ups involve an automatic re-investigation of the subject at least every six months, together with a re-evaluation of his condition. In addition, wherever possible, arrangements are made with relatives, neighbors, or local officers to advise our nearest field office immediately if the subject prepares to leave his home territory, becomes more threatening, or if other alarming indications develop in the interim between our periodic check ups. When dangerous persons are confined we furnish the institution with a large red notice for the subject's file folder, requesting immediate notification in the event the subject escapes or is discharged. When these people are released a determination is also made as to the need for periodic check ups. Some hundreds of cases fall into this check up category.

For information on some of the most dangerous individuals whose locations and movements are unpredictable, the Protective Research Section maintains an up-to-date picture album of photographs and identifying information in the squad room office of the presidential protection (White House) detail. Whenever information is received that the President intends to attend a function in Washington or is to leave the city on a trip the Protective Research Section makes a special survey of the known dangers in the areas involved. In this connection a geographical index file is maintained of cards relating to persons believed to be of current protective concern. As cases are processed and evaluations or re-evaluations are made on PRS subjects, cards are inserted in this file on new subjects of interest and old cards are withdrawn when subjects are no longer of serious concern. When anticipating a Presidential trip, the file jackets

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of the cases listed in the trip index are withdrawn and a survey is made for any new cases that are being processed, following which they are reviewed and re-evaluated. If it is still judged that the individual is of serious concern and he resides in the area or may travel to the area where the Presidential visit will occur, an alert notice is prepared. Such notices, together with any available pictures, go to the protective detail personnel and a reminder is given to the local field office, which in most instances is already familiar with the case because of previous investigation or action they have taken. In these cases the field office tries to locate the subjects in advance of the visit and either determine that they are not in a position to cause trouble or attempt to arrange for local police or others to keep an eye on such people until the visit is over. If any new dangers develop during a trip the personnel of the local field office and the protective detail are immediately alerted by telephone. Information received on proposed activities of pickets or demonstrators is likewise made known to the local field office, as well as to any of the protective details currently in that area.

Whenever advance agents are able to procure lists of waiters at banquets or other strange persons who may service the President on a trip the lists are checked through PRS files, and when feasible, through the indexes of other agencies.

In addition to the above, PRS also handles a variety of other duties, such as:

- (1) Manufacture, issue and control of White House Passes.
- (2) Procurement and evaluation of character investigations and clearance for some categories of White House employees.
- (3) Procurement of National Agency file checks and determinations of admittance restrictions on the large number of tradesmen, contract employees, etc., who service the White House.
- (4) Control of security processing of mail and gifts received at the White House.
- (5) Handling and disposition of suspicious packages or objects that may contain bombs or other infernal devices.
- (6) Evaluation of safety and control of disposition of all food, beverages and similar consumable items received by the President or the White House as gifts.
- (7) Control of investigations on personnel and establishments that are supply sources for for foods, beverages, drugs, etc., for the White House
- (8) The performance of technical and electronic inspections to protect against covert listening devices.
- (9) Determination of feasibility of application, establishment of specifications for procurement, and assistance in maintaining operation of a wide variety of electronic and technical protective aids.

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Robert J. Black