Chapter 10

Intelligence Community Coordination

Introduction

In the late 1960's and continuing into the early 1970's, widespread violence and civil disorder arose in many cities and on many campuses across the country.

President Johnson and later President Nixon acted on a number of fronts to organize the resources of the Federal government to determine the facts about those responsible for the turmoil. Both Presidents persistently demanded to know whether this violence and disorder was in any way supported or directed by foreign elements.

Inevitably, the CIA became a major factor in these undertakings, with action including:

(1) Participation in coordinated intelligence community efforts to deal with the disturbances;
(2) Creation of a Special Operations Group (“Operation CHAOS”) to investigate and analyze any foreign connections of domestic dissident groups (Chapter 11); and,
(3) Efforts of CIA’s Office of Security to protect CIA’s installations and campus recruiters from potentially violent dissent activity. (Chapter 12).

A. Summary

In 1967, the Justice Department under Attorney General Ramsey Clark established the first in a series of secret units designed to collate and evaluate information concerning the growing domestic disorder and violence.

The Justice Department’s initial effort failed to produce the desired intelligence results.

The CIA was consulted for advice on intelligence evaluation, and the Department of Justice under Attorney General John Mitchell
created another unit in 1969. This effort, too, failed to produce results satisfactory to the Administration.

Therefore, in June of 1970, President Nixon instructed the directors of four principal intelligence agencies to develop a plan for increased coordination and evaluation of domestic intelligence. This led the Nixon Administration in December of 1970 to create an interagency committee and staff, including representatives from the CIA, the FBI, and other principal intelligence agencies, for coordination and evaluation of intelligence related to domestic dissidence. This joint committee produced reports for President Nixon and certain other top governmental officials from February 1971 through May 1973.

All these efforts resulted from a realization in both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations that the Government of the United States had no effective capacity for evaluating intelligence concerning domestic events. The FBI, as an investigative agency, produced raw data but did not produce evaluated intelligence. The CIA produced intelligence evaluations, but its jurisdiction was limited to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. The problem was further complicated by the FBI's refusal during one period to cooperate fully with other components of the intelligence community.

This realization appears to have caused the White House to pressure the CIA into expanding the Agency's own activities related to domestic dissidence (see Chapter 11). The White House evidently also concluded that without some formal interagency coordination, it would not have an adequate source of domestic intelligence evaluations or estimates upon which to rely in attempting to deal with domestic disturbances.

The CIA's participation in these joint efforts warrants particular attention. Any involvement of the Agency in activities of the Department of Justice or in a domestic intelligence evaluation group could, at least on the surface, raise a question of impropriety, under 50 USC sec. 403(d), which prohibits the CIA from having "... law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

B. The "Interdivision Information Unit"

In early fall, 1967, Attorney General Clark asked John Doar, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, to report on the Department's facilities for organizing information on individuals involved in civil disorders. On September 27, 1967, Doar recommended establishment
of a “single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their base of operation.”

The FBI was to constitute only one source of information for the proposed unit. As additional sources, Doar suggested federal poverty programs, Labor Department programs, and neighborhood legal services. Doar recognized the “sensitivity” of using such additional sources, but he nevertheless thought these sources would have access to relevant facts. Other sources of dissident information suggested by Doar included the intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service and perhaps the Post Office Department. The CIA was not among the proposed sources.

Attorney General Clark, by memorandum dated November 9, 1967, approved Doar’s recommendation. Clark found it “imperative” that the Justice Department obtain “the most comprehensive intelligence possible regarding organized or other purposeful stimulation of domestic dissension, civil disorders and riots.” He appointed a committee of four Assistant Attorneys General to make recommendations concerning the organization and functioning of the proposed unit. “Planning and creation of the unit must be kept in strictest confidence,” Clark’s memorandum stated.

On December 6, 1967, the committee recommended in part that the new unit, in addition to analyzing FBI information, should develop contacts with other intelligence agencies, including the CIA, as possible sources of information. Following his committee’s recommendation, Attorney General Clark on December 18, 1967, directed the organization of the Interdivision Information Unit (“IDIU”). Objectives of the new Unit were:

... reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals throughout the country who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders or in preventing or checking them.

After its establishment, the IDIU commenced collecting, collating, and computerizing information on antiwar activists and other dissidents. The IDIU produced daily and weekly reports on dissident occurrences and attempted to predict significant future dissident activities.

C. Development of Justice Department-CIA Liaison

Problems of domestic dissidence were of immediate concern to the Nixon Administration when it took office.

Attorney General John Mitchell met with Director Helms of the
CIA on May 14, 1969, to discuss problems arising from domestic unrest and, more specifically, to discuss where within the government the entire question of domestic dissident intelligence could be handled.

The Attorney General explained that he felt the FBI was not acquiring the necessary intelligence concerning domestic unrest, although Mitchell also was of the opinion that the IDIU was improving in that regard. Helms offered to have a CIA liaison established with the Department of Justice to provide advice on the Department's intelligence efforts; but, because of the "political implications" involved, Helms rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that CIA personnel be assigned to the Justice Department unit.

Helms then asked the Chief of CIA's Special Operations Group, which ran Operation CHAOS, to establish the liaison with the Justice Department. He was to make contact with Jerris Leonard, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, and James Devine, another member of the Justice Department. Leonard coordinated the Department's efforts concerning civil disorders, and Devine, under Leonard, headed the IDIU.

The Chief of the CIA Special Operations Group met with Leonard on May 19 and with Leonard and Devine on May 27, 1969. According to notes taken at those meetings by the CIA officer, the Justice Department representatives explained that they and their units were responsible for receiving and evaluating information used to advise the Attorney General and the President as to when federal aid would be needed in civil disorders. The IDIU was the unit which received and indexed the information. Coordination and evaluation of that information was supposed to be the responsibility of a relatively inactive entity known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ("IEC"), which was composed of representatives from the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense and the Secret Service.

Conceding their ignorance of matters relating to intelligence evaluation, Leonard and Devine requested the CIA's assistance and advice in processing intelligence on civil disorders. Leonard also pressed the CIA officer to sit as a member of the IEC which, Leonard explained, was an informal group and would therefore permit any CIA role in it to remain hidden. The officer declined, saying that the CIA had no domestic jurisdiction and that Helms was reluctant to "have the Agency appear to be too deeply involved in domestic matters." However, the officer suggested that the CIA could probably be of assistance in supplying information on the foreign travel and contacts of individuals of interest, as well as in providing advice relating to the organization and evaluation of intelligence information.

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1 The activities of the CIA through Operation CHAOS are discussed fully in Chapter 11.
When the CIA officer reported to Helms on these meetings, the Director agreed with his position on the nature of the liaison and confirmed that there should be no formal participation by the CIA on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Helms also instructed the officer not to inform anyone else in the CIA of the newly established liaison. The Director suggested that, perhaps, the Chief of Counterintelligence, the liaison officer’s immediate supervisor, might be told at a later date—depending on developments. As a matter of fact, no one in the CIA other than Helms, his Executive Assistant and the liaison officer himself knew of the CIA’s liaison with the Justice Department during the following year.

D. Exchange of the IDIU Computer Listing

On June 18, 1969, Devine briefed the CIA liaison officer on the IDIU machine records system. Devine explained that the IDIU had often been unsuccessful in providing advance warning of incipient civil disorders because information concerning the disorders was not available far enough in advance. It was agreed that Devine would furnish the IDIU computer listing to the CIA for checking against the foreign travel records of dissidents, as held by Operation CHAOS, and to allow the CIA’s analysts the opportunity to suggest how the Justice Department might use its list more effectively.

The IDIU listing apparently contained the names of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 individuals, as well as brief narratives about their dissident activities. The head of Operation CHAOS found that the IDIU listing consisted principally of information derived from FBI reports. He concluded that any meaningful comparison with Operation CHAOS records was not reasonably feasible.

In September of 1969, the officer asked Devine for a duplicate of the actual IDIU computer tape and program. The idea was that, by matching the duplicate IDIU tape with the computer tape maintained by Operation CHAOS, it could possibly be determined whether the CIA had indexed information which the FBI had not already provided to the IDIU.

The duplicate IDIU computer tape and program were delivered to the Chief of Operations CHAOS and held by him personally in his private safe. Only the Chief, Director Helms, and a CHAOS computer programmer knew of the CIA’s possession of the Justice

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*The evidence reviewed by the Commission indicates that the listing of 10,000–12,000 names held by the IDIU and the compilation of 7,200 personality files held by Operation CHAOS (see Chapter 11) were developed independently of one another.*
Department materials. Subsequently, the Chief and the computer programmer attempted to match the Department of Justice tape with the Operation CHAOS computer system, but concluded that the matching would require too much time and effort. None of the information contained in the IDIU tapes was used by Operation CHAOS or incorporated into the CIA records. The IDIU materials were finally destroyed when Operation CHAOS was terminated in March 1974.

E. The "Civil Disturbance Group"

In a further attempt to coordinate the efforts of the Department of Justice to control civil disorders, Attorney General Mitchell, on July 22, 1969, established the "Civil Disturbance Group" (CDG). Both the IDIU and the IEC were placed under the jurisdiction of the Civil Disturbance Group, which was instructed to coordinate intelligence, policy, and action within the Department of Justice concerning domestic civil disturbances.

Although the plan establishing the CDG made no mention of the CIA, Helms was told of the plan almost immediately. On July 25, 1969, three days after the plan had been put into effect, the Attorney General met with Helms. According to handwritten notes made by Helms during that meeting, Attorney General Mitchell explained that the CDG had been created because the FBI could not provide the needed analysis of intelligence on civil disturbances. The FBI, the Attorney General noted, was an "investigative not [an] intelligence outfit." Mitchell asked Helms to have the CIA investigate the adequacy of the FBI's collection efforts in dissident matters and to persuade the FBI to turn over its material to the CDG. Apparently the Attorney General was experiencing some difficulty in obtaining cooperation within his own Department.

The CIA connection with the Civil Disturbance Group appears to have been minimal. Shortly after the CDG was established in July 1969, the Chief of Operation CHAOS, acting as the CIA liaison, assisted Jerris Leonard, as Chief of Staff for the CDG, and other Justice Department officials in establishing relationships with the military intelligence departments. In November 1969, the CIA liaison officer took part in a series of meetings with Leonard concerning preparations for handling an antiwar rally scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C. Intermittent contacts between the liaison officer and other Justice Department officers also occurred over the following two or three months.
The CDG did not satisfy the government's requirements for coordinated and evaluated intelligence on domestic upheaval. Both the Attorney General and the White House continued to receive only raw, unevaluated data from the FBI. In addition, cooperation within the intelligence community upon intelligence matters deteriorated substantially during late 1969 and early 1970. In late February 1970, J. Edgar Hoover forbade the Bureau to engage in anything but formal, written liaison with the CIA, because Helms had refused to compel a CIA officer to disclose to Hoover the name of an FBI agent who had given the officer certain FBI information late in 1969.

President Richard M. Nixon called a meeting at the White House on June 5, 1970, of the directors and officers from four of the major components of the intelligence community. Those attending included J. Edgar Hoover for the FBI, Richard Helms for the CIA, Vice Admiral Gayler for the National Security Agency and Lt. General Bennett for the Defense Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss problems relating to domestic disorders.

The President directed those present to make greater efforts to cover the activities of dissidents in the United States. He made it plain that he was dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence concerning the extent of any foreign connections with domestic dissidence. The possible relationship of Black radicalism in the Caribbean to Black militancy in the United States was discussed, and the President directed that a study on the subject be prepared. Finally, the President said that Mr. Hoover was to organize the group to draft a plan for coordination of domestic intelligence.

Four days later, on June 9, 1970, the "Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)" held its first meeting. The committee was composed of the directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA. Simultaneously, a subcommittee of representatives from the same agencies was established to accomplish the drafting of the ICI report. The CIA Counterintelligence Chief was designated as the CIA's representative on the subcommittee, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS served as an "observer" in the group. The subcommittee was officially constituted within the United States Intelligence Board, but this appears to have been done simply to provide an organizational cover for the activities of the subcommittee. Minutes of the subcommittee's meetings show that, in fact, the subcommittee was "an inde-

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3 Operation CHAOS eventually did prepare such a study. It was delivered over the signature of Director Richard Helms to Tom Huston on July 6, 1970, for handing to the President.
ependent, ad hoc, inter-agency group with a specific mandate,” and that the “scope and direction of the review [conducted by the sub-committee] will be determined by the White House.”

Two of the stated objectives for the ICI were: (1) to assure a “higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts” and (2) to assure “maximum use of all special investigative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.” An unstated objective was to effect greater cooperation and evaluation of data by the FBI. Charles Huston, the White House liaison on the ICI, stated the problem during the first meeting of the Committee: “The President receives uncoordinated information which he has to put together,” or, as Helms told the CIA’s observer later in June 1970, “the heart of the matter” was to “get the FBI to do what it was not doing.”

Huston made it clear at the initial ICI meeting that President Nixon wanted the Committee to assume that all methods of gathering intelligence were valid. The President, Huston said, wanted the Committee, in reviewing matters which “obstructed” intelligence gathering, to consider that “everything is valid, everything is possible.” All restrictions on methods were to be listed, according to Huston, so that the President could make a final decision on which methods would be employed.

A forty-three page “Special Report” was issued by the ICI on June 25, 1970. The Report assessed the internal security threat posed by the major domestic dissident groups as well as by foreign organizations. The CIA’s contribution to this section of the Report was entitled, “Definition of Internal Security Threat—Foreign,” and encompassed only the foreign aspects of the problem.

The ICI’s Report also considered the effect of legal restraints and constitutional safeguards limiting the methods which the government could employ in the collection of domestic intelligence. The enumerated methods which were subject to “restraints” included electronic surveillance, mail coverage, surreptitious entry and development of campus sources. Covert mail coverage and surreptitious entry were specifically described as illegal. The Special Report listed the benefits or detriments to be derived from employing such methods but did not expressly recommend their use; instead, it specified possible alternatives concerning each of them. The FBI expressed opposition to any change in existing procedures.

Finally, the ICI’s Report concluded that:

There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination and continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.
The ICI recommended establishment of an interagency group for evaluation and coordination of domestic intelligence, a proposal which the CIA representatives had supported throughout the Committee's meetings. Director Hoover opposed the recommendation.

On July 9, 1970, Huston advised Director Helms that all communications to the White House on domestic intelligence or internal security matters were thereafter to be addressed to Huston's exclusive attention. At approximately the same time, Huston recommended to the President, through H. R. Haldeman, that almost all the restraints on methods of intelligence collection discussed in the ICI's Special Report should be relaxed. Haldeman advised Huston on July 14, 1970, that the President had approved Huston's recommendations.

By memorandum dated July 23, 1970, Huston informed Helms and the other members of the ICI of the President's decision. Under the "Huston Plan," prohibitions against covert mail coverage, surreptitious entry and electronic surveillance were to be relaxed or removed. Huston further advised the ICI members that a committee composed of representatives from the FBI, the CIA, the NSA and the DIA was to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide domestic intelligence evaluations.

Apparently Attorney General Mitchell was not aware of the June 5, 1970, meeting between the President and the heads of the intelligence community or of the course of meetings and events leading up to the President's decision and direction on the Huston Plan. Attorney General Mitchell told Helms on July 27, 1970, that he had not heard of the Huston Plan until earlier that same day, when Hoover had complained to him about Huston's July 23 memorandum. In a memorandum he made of their meeting, Helms said Mitchell had been "frank" in stating that no action should be taken on Huston's directive until Mitchell had spoken with the President. Subsequently, Mitchell expressed his opposition to the Huston Plan, apparently with success. The next day, July 28, the White House asked Helms to return his copy of Huston's July 23 memorandum. Soon thereafter, in late August or early September, John Dean was assigned White House responsibility for domestic intelligence on internal security matters.

Sometime during this same period, the Attorney General discussed with Director Helms the continuing lack of evaluated domestic intelligence and the absence of coordination on that matter within the intelligence community. Mitchell said that he was considering the possibility of a small unit within the Department of Justice for the assembling and evaluation of domestic intelligence. A luncheon for the Attorney General was arranged at the CIA Headquarters on September 17, 1970, to discuss this possibility.
In addition to Mitchell and Helms, the Deputy Director for Plans, the Chief of Counterintelligence, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS were present for the discussion on September 17. According to notes made at the luncheon meeting, the group discussed problems of the existing domestic intelligence procedures. Specifically, it was again emphasized that the FBI did not have any “organization for evaluation of domestic intelligence.” Further, the Justice Department’s IDIU was characterized as “useless” for evaluation purposes because the unit often did not receive information until after the events happened. The luncheon group proposed that a unit be established within the Justice Department to “provide evaluated intelligence from all sources” and “allow preventive action” to be taken in time.

One of the options discussed was the revival within the Justice Department of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. The revived IEC would include the CIA and perhaps a White House representative, and it would be charged with the responsibility of coordination and evaluation. To avoid duplication of effort, the new IEC would draw upon the files and indices maintained by the participating agencies, rather than setting up its own files.

Shortly after the September 17, 1970, luncheon, Attorney General Mitchell met with John Dean to discuss the prompt organization of the new domestic intelligence unit. It was Dean’s suggestion that an interagency domestic intelligence unit be used for both operational and evaluation purposes. Dean further suggested that, while initially there would be no blanket removal of the restrictions on the methods of intelligence collection, eventually restraints could be removed as far as necessary to obtain intelligence on a particular subject. Dean also thought that the existing but inactive IDIU would provide an “appropriate Justice Department cover” and eliminate the chance of public discovery of a new intelligence operation within the Department of Justice.

G. The “Intelligence Evaluation Committee”

The Administration thus decided to revise and reactivate the moribund Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) of the Department of Justice. The initial meeting of the reconstituted IEC occurred on December 3, 1970, in John Dean’s office in the Old Executive Office Building. Several other meetings of an organizational nature were held from time to time through February 1971.

The Committee was composed of representatives from the Department of Justice, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the
Secret Service and the National Security Agency. A representative of the Treasury Department was invited to participate in the last two IEC meetings. The Chief of Counterintelligence was the CIA representative on the IEC, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS was his alternate.

Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for the Internal Security Division, was technically Chairman of the IEC, while John Dean served as the White House representative. The ultimate authority over the Committee was somewhat fuzzy; both Mardian and Dean stated requirements and made assignments to the Committee.

The IEC was not established by Executive Order. In fact, according to minutes of the IEC meeting on February 1, 1971, Dean said he favored avoiding any written directive concerning the IEC because a directive "might create problems of Congressional oversight and disclosure." Several attempts were nevertheless made to draft a charter for the Committee, although none appears to have been accepted by all of the IEC members. The last draft which could be located, dated February 10, 1971, specified the "authority" for the IEC as "the Interdepartmental Actional Plan for Civil Disturbances," something which had been issued in April 1969 as the result of an agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense. Dean thought it was sufficient just to say that the IEC existed "by authority of the President."

Revitalization of the IEC in December 1970 appears clearly to have sprung from the suggestions of the ICT's Special Report. Helms testified that he understood that the IEC had been organized to focus and coordinate intelligence on domestic dissidence. Handwritten notes made by the CIA Counterintelligence Chief during an IEC meeting on January 25, 1971, indicate that the IEC was in part an "implementation of the ad hoc committee report." But, because Hoover had objected so strongly to the ICT's report, no reference was to be made to it during the IEC meetings.

The Counterintelligence Chief's notes also reflect that the operation of the IEC was to be "done with the tools we now have." This Commission's staff did not find any indication that the IEC attempted to adopt the suggestions in the Huston Plan for ignoring legal restrictions on intelligence gathering in the United States.

The January 25, 1971, meeting of the IEC also concerned recruiting a staff for the Committee. Mardian suggested that each of the participating agencies should contribute an individual to work on the staff, although Hoover had already made it clear the FBI would refuse either to contribute to the IEC budget or to provide personnel for the staff.
H. The "Intelligence Evaluation Staff"

A staff for the IEC was organized by the end of January 1971. That group, called the Intelligence Evaluation Staff ("IES"), held its first meeting on January 29, 1971. Unlike the Committee, which was intended to function as a "think tank," the Staff was to do the work of coordination, evaluation and preparation of estimates for issuance by the Committee.

The Chief of Operation CHAOS was the CIA representative on the IES. He attended such IES meetings as were called, and he coordinated the CIA's contributions to the IES evaluations and estimates. The Operation Chief was not assigned to the IES on a full-time basis. Representatives of the NSA, the Secret Service and the military intelligence services also served on the IES. Finally, in May 1971, the FBI also assigned a representative to aid the staff.

Although the Department of Justice's IDIU was not actually involved in the work of the IES, the IES was "attached to [the IDIU] for cover purposes."

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee met on only seven occasions; the last occasion was in July 1971. The Intelligence Evaluation Staff, on the other hand, met a total of one hundred and seventeen times between January 29, 1971, and May 4, 1973.

The IES prepared an aggregate of approximately thirty studies or evaluations for dissemination. It also published a total of fifty-five summaries called intelligence calendars of significant events. The preparation of these studies, estimates or calendars was directed by John Dean from the White House or by Robert Mardian as Chairman of the IEC.

The initial studies related to the "May Day" demonstrations held in 1971, and later reports concerned other proposed antiwar demonstrations, racial protests or planned violence. From January to August 1972, the IEC/IES issued, and regularly revised, reports covering the potential for disruptions at both the 1972 Republican and Democratic National Conventions.

Many of the IEC reports contained information having both domestic and international aspects. The CIA made a number of contributions to the IEC/IES publications. Those contributions were prepared by Operation CHAOS personnel (see Chapter 11). However, the contributions appear to have been a by-product of ongoing activities abroad. Review of all the contributions reveals that the CIA reported, with only minor exceptions, on matters relating strictly to foreign or international events or organizations.

It appears the only participation by the CHAOS Chief in the IES,
aside from serving as the CIA liaison in preparing the Agency's contributions, was to edit drafts of the Staff's reports. Mardian himself did ask the Chief to use the CIA's computer index for name traces in connection with the March 1971 Capitol bombing incident, the "Pentagon Papers" case and the Berrigan Brothers case. But no evidence was found that the CIA was asked by either the IEC or the IES to collect domestic intelligence.

The agents run by the CIA's Operation CHAOS appear on only one occasion to have been directed to collect information domestically which was used for IEC/IES purposes. That was the use of one agent during the 1971 May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C., which is described more fully in Chapter 11. CHAOS forwarded the information supplied by that agent to the FBI, and some of the information ultimately may have been incorporated in IEC publications concerning the May Day demonstrations.

Director Helms told the CIA liaison officer during a meeting on December 5, 1972, that the Agency "should minimize its contributions to the IEC, with the expectation that eventually the organization may disappear." Helms in his testimony was unable to recall the basis for this instruction. By then, however, the fact that Attorney General Mitchell and Robert Mardian had long since resigned to work on President Nixon's reelection campaign, plus the substantial decline in the incidence of civil disorder, all contributed to the lapse in IEC/IES activity.

The IEC and IES were terminated in July 1973 by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.

Conclusions

The CIA's liaison with the Department of Justice and the Agency's participation in interagency intelligence groups resulted from attempts to utilize the CIA's expertise in intelligence evaluation and its collection of intelligence abroad having a bearing upon domestic dissidence.

This attempted use occurred because two Administrations believed the government of the United States lacked an effective capacity to coordinate and evaluate intelligence on matters affecting internal security.

The available evidence indicates that the CIA's participation in meetings of the IES was limited to providing advice on foreign intelligence and evaluation techniques and to editing reports. The

*This appears to have been a short cut of the general procedure in the Justice Department to make requests for name checks by the CIA through the FBI.
Agency's substantive contributions to the IES were restricted to foreign aspects, if any, of the relevant problems.

The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on evaluation techniques to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation organizations having some domestic aspects.

The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, some of them concerned wholly with domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance of impropriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised to approach such participation reluctantly.

The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance in which he directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.

**Recommendation (14)**

a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or elsewhere in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters of internal security.

b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelligence committees to foreign intelligence matters.

c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA for such foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as is relevant to FBI needs.